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OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.   
Robert Zimmerman was riding his motorcycle on a 
summer evening in 2008. He approached a railroad crossing, 
but it was dark and a building obscured the tracks. When he 
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was less than seventy-six feet away, he noticed that a train 
was approaching. He tried to stop, but his front brake locked 
and he flew over the handlebars, colliding headfirst with a 
locomotive. The collision left him partially paralyzed. He 
sued Norfolk Southern Corporation in federal court, asserting 
three state tort claims.
1
 
Railroads are among the most heavily regulated 
American industries. Unfortunately for Zimmerman, many of 
these regulations preempt state tort claims. The Federal 
Railroad Safety Act (―FRSA‖) contains a provision that 
outlines the scope of preemption. 49 U.S.C. § 20106. The 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania relied 
on this provision in granting summary judgment for Norfolk 
Southern, concluding that most of Zimmerman’s claims were 
preempted. We will reverse in part and affirm in part.  
I 
Diller Avenue is a two-lane road that runs diagonally 
through New Holland, Pennsylvania. In the southern part of 
town, Diller Avenue intersects a railroad track owned and 
                                           
1
 The proper party to this action appears to be Norfolk 
Southern Railway Company, a subsidiary of Norfolk 
Southern Corporation, but neither party has moved to amend 
the caption. See Zimmerman v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. 10-cv-
02267, 2011 WL 3625039, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 
2011). We refer throughout to the appellee as Norfolk 
Southern. 
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operated by Norfolk Southern. Because of the location of a 
tavern northwest of the crossing, southbound motorists have a 
difficult time seeing eastbound trains. For example, a motorist 
who is seventy-six feet away can see only sixty-five feet 
down the tracks. The speed limit on Diller Avenue is thirty-
five miles per hour, while the speed limit on the tracks is 
subject to some disagreement. Norfolk Southern argues that 
the limit is at least twenty-five and maybe forty miles per 
hour, but Zimmerman argues that it is ten miles per hour.  
The Diller Avenue crossing has been the scene of a 
number of accidents over the years. Five accidents were 
reported at the crossing in the 1970s. A decade later, the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the crossing’s former 
owner installed two white railroad-crossing signs, called 
crossbucks, with the use of federal funds. Since the 
installation of these signs, five more accidents have been 
reported. At the time of Zimmerman’s accident, there was a 
crossbuck fixed on each side of the track; there was also a 
yellow warning sign on Diller Avenue, 150 feet north of the 
crossing, together with painted warnings on the street. 
Zimmerman contends that these warnings had fallen into 
disrepair—tree branches covered the signs on the north side 
and the street markings had faded.  
On June 12, 2008, Zimmerman celebrated his thirty-
eighth birthday. After a game of church softball and a trip to 
his mother’s house, he headed for home on his motorcycle. It 
was dark, and Zimmerman was wearing a helmet and riding 
within the speed limit. He turned south onto Diller Avenue 
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and approached the crossing—a crossing he did not believe 
was still active. Meanwhile, an eastbound Norfolk Southern 
train consisting of only two engines approached the crossing 
travelling twenty-four miles per hour. It sounded its horn.  
Zimmerman apparently failed to notice that the train 
was about to enter the crossing until he was less than seventy-
six feet away.
2
 At that point, he was too close to the track to 
stop.
3
 One of the train operators noticed Zimmerman around 
this time but could not stop the train soon enough to avoid the 
collision. Zimmerman aggressively applied the brake of his 
motorcycle, causing the front wheel to lock. He flipped over 
the handlebar and flew headfirst into the gas tank of the lead 
engine. The collision left him partially paralyzed.  
Zimmerman sued Norfolk Southern in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania under Pennsylvania tort law. His 
complaint listed four counts: failure to warn; failure to 
maintain a safe crossing; failure to ensure that the crossing 
devices complied with federal regulations; and punitive 
damages. On August 17, 2011, the District Court granted 
                                           
2
 Zimmerman has only a vague recollection of the 
events, so the experts have attempted to recreate the crash. 
One of Zimmerman’s experts concluded that ―[w]hen 
Zimmerman was 76 to 97 feet away from the point of 
collision, the train was not visible.‖ J.A. 687. 
3
 According to Zimmerman’s expert, a vehicle 
travelling thirty-five miles per hour needs at least seventy-six 
feet to stop. 
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Norfolk Southern’s motion for summary judgment, 
concluding that some of Zimmerman’s claims were 
preempted and that others did not create a genuine issue of 
material fact. 
Zimmerman filed a timely notice of appeal.
4
 We 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s decision to 
grant a motion for summary judgment. Orvosh v. Program of 
Grp. Ins. for Salaried Emps. of Volkswagen of Am., 222 F.3d 
123, 129 (3d Cir. 2000). We construe the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Zimmerman, Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986), and we 
affirm ―if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law,‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A ―genuine 
dispute‖ exists if a reasonable jury could find for the 
nonmoving party. Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 337 
(3d Cir. 2002). 
II 
The doctrine of preemption permeates Zimmerman’s 
appeal. Norfolk Southern argues that various federal 
regulations preempt Zimmerman’s claims under the FRSA 
preemption provision. 49 U.S.C. § 20106. We have 
interpreted the provision a few times over the years, but 
Congress changed it in 2007. We begin our discussion by 
                                           
4
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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providing a framework for analyzing preemption under the 
amended FRSA. We do so because we have yet to interpret 
the amendment and because this analysis is relevant to each 
of Zimmerman’s claims. We then turn to those claims. 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution is the source of preemption. U.S. Const. art. VI, 
cl. 2. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law trumps or 
preempts state law whenever the two are in conflict. 
Preemption can be express or implied—either way, the effect 
is the same: preemption renders the relevant state law invalid. 
See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 
(1992); Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 334 
(3d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that implied preemption comes in 
two varieties: field preemption and conflict preemption). We 
tend to interpret federal statutes in a way that avoids implied 
preemption. Holk, 575 F.3d at 334 (citing Bates v. Dow 
Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)). The same is 
not true of express preemption. 
Here, the FRSA expressly preempts state railroad law. 
Subsection (a) outlines the scope of FRSA preemption: 
―Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety . . . 
shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable.‖ 49 
U.S.C. § 20106(a)(1). Yet the FRSA does not preempt all 
state railroad law: ―A State may adopt or continue in force a 
law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security 
until the Secretary of Transportation . . . prescribes a 
regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of 
the State requirement.‖ Id. § 20106(a)(2). Moreover, states 
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may adopt a ―more stringent law‖ if it is necessary to 
eliminate a ―local safety or security hazard.‖ Id. 
§ 20106(a)(2)(A). As the Supreme Court has noted, the FRSA 
―displays considerable solicitude for state law.‖ CSX Transp., 
Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 665 (1993); see also 
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 352–54 (2000). 
Before the 2007 amendment, we held that a federal 
regulation preempts state law under subsection (a) if the 
regulation ―substantially subsume[s] the subject matter of the 
relevant state law.‖ Strozyk v. Norfolk S. Corp., 358 F.3d 268, 
271 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664) 
(quotation marks omitted). The regulation must do more than 
simply ―touch upon or relate to [the] subject matter‖ of the 
state law. Id. at 273 (quoting Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Congress amended the FRSA preemption provision in 
2007 by adding subsection (b), which is a ―[c]larification 
regarding State law causes of action‖: 
(1) Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
preempt an action under State law seeking 
damages for personal injury, death, or property 
damage alleging that a party— 
(A) has failed to comply with the Federal 
standard of care established by a regulation 
or order issued by the Secretary of 
Transportation . . . or the Secretary of 
Homeland Security . . . , covering the 
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subject matter as provided in subsection (a) 
of this section; 
(B) has failed to comply with its own plan, 
rule, or standard that it created pursuant to a 
regulation or order issued by either of the 
Secretaries; or 
(C) has failed to comply with a State law, 
regulation, or order that is not incompatible 
with subsection (a)(2). 
49 U.S.C. § 20106(b)(1).  
The question before us is how to interpret the FRSA 
preemption provision in light of the 2007 amendment. 
Zimmerman argues that the amendment restricts the scope of 
preemption and thus supersedes all prior cases interpreting 
subsection (a), including our decision in Strozyk and the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Shanklin and Easterwood. 
Norfolk Southern agrees that the amendment restricts 
preemption in some respects but argues that it preserves cases 
interpreting the phrase ―covering the subject matter of the 
State requirement.‖ Id. § 20106(a)(2). We agree with Norfolk 
Southern’s interpretation. 
Statutory interpretation requires that we begin with a 
careful reading of the text. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 
F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that this Court 
―decline[s] to employ legislative history if a statute is clear on 
its face‖); Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 
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F.3d 404, 406 (3d Cir. 2004). The scope of the amendment is 
clear from the text: it clarifies that claimants can avoid 
preemption by alleging a violation of either a ―Federal 
standard of care‖ or the railroad’s ―own plan, rule, or standard 
that it created pursuant to a regulation or order.‖ 49 U.S.C. 
§ 20106(b)(1)(A)–(B). The amendment otherwise preserves 
the analysis for deciding whether a regulation preempts state 
law.  
For starters, the amendment did not change the 
language of subsection (a). Federal regulations still preempt 
state law if they ―cover[] the subject matter.‖ Id. 
§ 20106(a)(2). The continued use of this language indicates 
that the analysis remains the same. In fact, the amendment 
explicitly preserves the right to seek damages for violating 
state law, as long as the law is compatible with subsection 
(a)(2). See id. § 20106(b)(1)(C). Moreover, the title of the 
new subsection (b) is ―Clarification regarding State law 
causes of action.‖ The word ―clarification‖ suggests that the 
amendment attempted to resolve an ambiguity rather than 
change substantive law. See Henning v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 
530 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2008) (―[T]he [title] . . . 
indicates Congress sought to resolve an ambiguity rather than 
effect a substantive change.‖). The amendment thus preserves 
cases such as Strozyk and Shanklin that analyzed whether a 
regulation covers state law. The amendment is significant for 
a different reason: it clarifies that even when a regulation 
covers the subject matter of a claim, the claim can avoid 
preemption if the railroad violated a federal standard of care 
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or its internal rule. See 49 U.S.C. § 20106(b)(1)(A)–(B).5 
                                           
5
 Although the amendment’s plain text resolves the 
question before us, its history is entirely consistent with our 
analysis. In 2002, a train carrying anhydrous ammonia 
derailed in Minot, North Dakota. Toxins filled the air, forcing 
many local residents to evacuate. The toxins killed one person 
and injured at least a hundred others. Two federal district 
courts considered tort claims arising from the derailment. 
Lundeen v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 
1009 (D. Minn. 2007); Mehl v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 417 
F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1106 (D.N.D. 2006). In both cases, the 
courts interpreted the FRSA and concluded that the plaintiffs’ 
tort claims were preempted, even though the plaintiffs alleged 
that the railroad violated federal regulations and its own 
internal rules. See Mehl, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1116–17 (holding 
that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted despite allegations 
that the railroad violated federal regulations); Lundeen, 507 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1011–12 (holding that the plaintiffs’ claims were 
preempted despite allegations that the railroad violated its 
internal rules).  
Congress renounced these interpretations by passing 
the 2007 amendment. A conference report stated that the goal 
was ―to rectify the Federal court decisions related to the 
Minot, North Dakota accident that are in conflict with 
precedent.‖ H.R. Rep. No. 110-259, at 351 (2007), reprinted 
in 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. 119, 119. The report also states that the 
―restructuring is not intended to indicate any substantive 
change in the meaning of the provision.‖ Id. 
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We therefore conclude that the preemption analysis 
under the amended FRSA requires a two-step process. We 
first ask whether the defendant allegedly violated either a 
federal standard of care or an internal rule that was created 
pursuant to a federal regulation. If so, the plaintiff’s claim 
avoids preemption. See 49 U.S.C. § 20106(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
Otherwise, we move to the second step and ask whether any 
federal regulation covers the plaintiff’s claim. See id. 
§ 20106(a)(2). A regulation covers—and thus preempts—the 
plaintiff’s claim if it ―substantially subsume[s] the subject 
matter‖ of that claim. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664 (noting 
that the regulation must do more than ―touch upon or relate to 
[the] subject matter‖). In this step, we rely on precedent—
including cases that predate the 2007 amendment. This two-
step approach is consistent with the text of the amended 
FRSA and its history, and is similar to approaches in the 
Eighth and Tenth Circuits. Grade v. BNSF Ry. Co., 676 F.3d 
680, 686 (8th Cir. 2012); Henning, 530 F.3d at 1216. 
III 
We address each of Zimmerman’s claims in turn. 
A 
Zimmerman’s first claim is that Norfolk Southern 
negligently failed to warn him of the approaching train. In 
Zimmerman’s complaint, this claim has at least three parts: 
(1) the train failed to obey the speed limit; (2) the train failed 
to use its light and horn; and (3) Norfolk Southern failed to 
provide motorists with an adequate view of the track. But 
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Zimmerman conceded during oral argument that he lacks 
evidence that the train failed to use its light and horn, and the 
duty to provide adequate sight distance is a separate duty, as 
discussed in Part III.B. Zimmerman’s first claim thus boils 
down to a single claim: excessive speed.  
1. Zimmerman’s excessive-speed claim is not 
preempted because 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 creates 
a federal standard of care. 
Railroads have a duty under Pennsylvania law to warn 
motorists of approaching trains. Wilson v. Pa. R.R. Co., 219 
A.2d 666, 668–69 (Pa. 1966). This duty requires railroads to 
avoid excessive speeds, since motorists are less likely to see 
speeding trains, and sight is an important warning method. 
See id. (explaining the relationship between a train’s speed 
and its warning and noting that speeding trains have less time 
to stop); see also Conner v. Pa. R.R. Co., 263 F.2d 944, 945–
46 (3d Cir. 1959). 
Norfolk Southern allegedly violated this duty by 
operating its train at more than double the speed limit. A 
federal regulation establishes the speed limit for each class of 
tracks: ten miles per hour for freight trains on Class 1 tracks, 
twenty-five miles per hour on Class 2 tracks, forty miles per 
hour on Class 3 tracks, and so on. 49 C.F.R. § 213.9. Both 
sides agree that the train was travelling no more than twenty-
five miles per hour when it entered the crossing. Zimmerman 
alleges that the track at the crossing was Class 1, which 
would mean the train was travelling in excess of the speed 
limit. Norfolk Southern responds that the track was Class 2 or 
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3, which would mean the train was travelling within the limit.  
The initial question is whether 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 
preempts Zimmerman’s excessive-speed claim. We note at 
the outset that no other federal court of appeals has 
considered whether such claims are preempted under the 
amended FRSA provision. Before the 2007 amendment, the 
Supreme Court held that speeding claims are preempted when 
a train is travelling below the federally mandated speed limit. 
Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 673–75 (concluding that the 
plaintiff’s claim was preempted when the train was travelling, 
at most, fifty miles per hour on tracks with a limit of sixty 
miles per hour); see also Waymire v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 
218 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2000) (relying on Easterwood to 
conclude that an excessive-speed claim was preempted under 
the FRSA when the train was travelling below the speed 
limit). But Easterwood is inapposite here because 
Zimmerman alleges that the train he collided with was 
travelling above the speed limit.  
Zimmerman’s excessive-speed claim avoids 
preemption if § 213.9 creates a federal standard of care. A 
regulation creates a standard of care for FRSA preemption 
purposes if it establishes the degree of care that the 
defendant—in most cases, the railroad—must exercise. See 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1441 (8th ed. 2004) (defining 
―standard of care‖ as ―the degree of care that a reasonable 
person should exercise‖); see also Henning, 530 F.3d at 1216 
(concluding there is no federal standard of care if the 
regulation takes the ―final authority to decide‖ what action is 
 15 
 
needed ―out of the railroad’s [hands]‖ (internal quotations 
marks and citations omitted)); Grade, 676 F.3d at 686 (same).  
The Minot derailment cases provide a good example of 
regulations that create a federal standard of care. Indeed, at 
least some members of Congress had these cases in mind 
when amending the FRSA. See H.R. Rep. No. 110-259, at 
351 (2007), reprinted in 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. 119, 119 (noting 
that the goal of the FRSA amendment was ―to rectify the 
Federal court decisions related to the Minot, North Dakota 
accident that are in conflict with precedent‖). The plaintiffs in 
Mehl v. Canadian Pacific Railway alleged that the railroad 
had violated a number of regulations, including 49 C.F.R. 
§§ 215.11 and 215.13, which require railroads to inspect 
tracks and freight cars. See 417 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1115 & n.5 
(D.N.D. 2006). In prescribing how these inspections should 
be carried out, the regulations create a federal standard of care 
because they establish the degree of care that railroads must 
exercise. By contrast, a regulation does not establish a federal 
standard of care if the state is responsible for compliance. See 
Grade, 676 F.3d at 686 (concluding that various regulations 
did not create a federal standard of care because they ―place 
the responsibility for implementing adequate warning devices 
on the State, thereby preempting any cause of action alleging 
a railroad failed to properly install an adequate warning 
device‖). After all, if the state is responsible, railroads cannot, 
―as a matter of law, fail to comply‖ with the regulation. Id. 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
We conclude that the speed limits in § 213.9 create a 
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federal standard of care. Section 213.9 establishes the degree 
of care that railroads must exercise on each class of tracks: 
trains should not exceed ten miles per hour on Class 1 tracks, 
twenty-five miles per hour on Class 2 tracks, and so on. Like 
the regulations in Mehl and unlike the regulations in Grade, 
railroads are ultimately responsible for compliance—they 
must ensure that their trains are travelling within the limit. As 
a result, Zimmerman’s speeding claim is not preempted. 
Because his claim avoids preemption in the first step of the 
FRSA preemption analysis, we need not consider the second 
step. 
2. The District Court improperly excluded eight 
crossing reports. 
Zimmerman’s excessive-speed claim has cleared the 
preemption hurdle, but it must also clear an evidentiary 
hurdle. Zimmerman acknowledges that the train was 
travelling within the speed limit for Class 2 and Class 3 
tracks. He alleges, however, that the track was Class 1. There 
is some evidence to support this allegation. 
The record contains two types of documents that help 
Zimmerman: crossing reports from the Department of 
Transportation’s National Crossing Inventory and accident 
reports from a similar database. The crossing reports state that 
the speed limit is ten or fifteen miles per hour, and at least 
some of the accident reports suggest that the track is Class 1. 
The District Court nevertheless excluded these documents 
based on two evidentiary privileges: 23 U.S.C. § 409 and 49 
U.S.C. § 20903. Zimmerman argues that the District Court 
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misconstrued these privileges. We consider the crossing 
reports here and the accident reports in the next section. 
The National Crossing Inventory is a database of 
highway-railroad crossings in the United States. The 
inventory contains reports on each crossing, which include 
information such as the number of trains that pass through 
daily, the typical train speed, and the maximum speed. 
Zimmerman accessed the database and obtained nine reports 
on the Diller Avenue crossing—the oldest from 1970 and the 
most recent from 2010. The nine reports were submitted to 
the national inventory by different entities: four by the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, two by Norfolk Southern, 
and two by Conrail, the prior owner of the crossing. It is 
unclear who submitted the initial report. The reports state that 
the typical train speed over the crossing is five to ten miles 
per hour and that the ―Maximum Time Table Speed‖ is ten or 
fifteen miles per hour.
6
 
According to these crossing reports, Norfolk 
Southern’s train was travelling too fast at the time of the 
collision. Nevertheless, the District Court excluded them 
based on the privilege created by 23 U.S.C. § 409: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
                                           
6
 Eight crossing reports state that the ―Maximum Time 
Table Speed‖ is ―10‖—presumably meaning miles per hour. 
J.A. 995–1012. The ninth report states that the maximum 
speed is ―15.‖ Id. at 1008–09.  
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reports, surveys, schedules, lists, or data 
compiled or collected for the purpose of 
identifying, evaluating, or planning the safety 
enhancement of potential accident sites, 
hazardous roadway conditions, or railway-
highway crossings, pursuant to sections 130, 
144, and 148 of this title or for the purpose of 
developing any highway safety construction 
improvement project which may be 
implemented utilizing Federal-aid highway 
funds shall not be subject to discovery or 
admitted into evidence in a Federal or State 
court proceeding or considered for other 
purposes in any action for damages arising from 
any occurrence at a location mentioned or 
addressed in such reports, surveys, schedules, 
lists, or data. 
Though pleonastically expressed, this statutory 
privilege clearly has two parts. The first part excludes reports, 
data, and the like if they were compiled or collected to 
identify, evaluate, or plan ―the safety enhancement of 
potential accident sites, hazardous roadway conditions, or 
railway-highway crossings, pursuant to sections 130, 144, and 
148 of [Title 23].‖ The second part excludes such documents 
if they were compiled or collected to develop ―any highway 
safety construction improvement project which may be 
implemented utilizing Federal-aid highway funds.‖ The 
District Court concluded that the crossing reports were 
privileged under the first part of § 409. 
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Like all evidentiary privileges, we interpret this 
privilege narrowly. Pierce Cnty. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 144 
(2003) (concluding that courts should interpret § 409 
narrowly because it ―impede[s] the search for the truth‖). 
Moreover, the party invoking an evidentiary privilege has the 
burden of proof. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 
374, 385 n.15 (3d Cir. 1990) (―[A] party who asserts a 
privilege has the burden of proving its existence and 
applicability.‖). 
We begin with the first part of the § 409 privilege. 
Both sides agree that the reports from the National Crossing 
Inventory were collected to evaluate railway-highway 
crossings. They disagree, however, that the reports were 
collected ―pursuant to sections 130, 144, and 148 of [Title 
23].‖ Zimmerman asserts that collection of the reports was 
not pursuant to any section, while Norfolk Southern asserts 
that they were collected pursuant to § 130.  
Congress passed the Federal-Aid Highway Act in 
1973. Pub. L. No. 93-87, 87 Stat. 250 (1973). The Act created 
the Federal Railroad Administration and imposed various 
safety-related obligations on states that accept federal funds. 
Some of these obligations are now codified in 23 U.S.C. 
§ 130. In particular, subsection (d) requires states to maintain 
an inventory of railroad crossings within their borders: 
Each State shall conduct and systematically 
maintain a survey of all highways to identify 
those railroad crossings which may require 
separation, relocation, or protective devices, and 
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establish and implement a schedule of projects 
for this purpose. At a minimum, such a 
schedule shall provide signs for all railway-
highway crossings. 
23 U.S.C. § 130(d). When it was first passed, the Act did not 
require any federal agency to maintain a national crossing 
inventory. 
Despite the absence of a statutory requirement, various 
federal agencies, state highway departments, and private 
railroad associations ―formed a voluntary cooperative effort‖ 
to create the National Crossing Inventory. Federal Railroad 
Administration, U.S. DOT National Highway-Rail Crossing 
Inventory: Policy, Procedures and Instructions for States and 
Railroads 3 (2007), 
http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/safety/RXIPolicyInstructio
ns0807.pdf [―2007 Manual‖]. Railroads and the Department 
of Transportation agreed to share the costs, and the Federal 
Railroad Administration became responsible for maintaining 
the national inventory. See Federal Railroad Administration, 
Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory Instructions and 
Procedures Manual 1-3 to 1-4 (1996), 
http://www.fra.dot.gov/rrs/pages/fp_1499.shtml [―1996 
Manual‖].  
Over the next few decades, states and railroads 
voluntarily submitted information to the inventory. The 
submission process changed over time—states and railroads 
sometimes submitted information independently, and 
railroads sometimes submitted information to states, which 
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then passed it along to the national inventory. Compare id. at 
4-1 (―[T]he State transportation agency should be the party 
who forwards all data item changes for any and all crossings 
to the [Federal Railroad Administration].‖ (emphasis 
omitted)), with 2007 Manual at 44–45 (indicating that 
railroads should send some information directly to the Federal 
Railroad Administration). Many states willingly submitted 
information to the national inventory because they were able 
to meet their duty to create a statewide inventory under 
§ 130(d) by participating in the national inventory. See 1996 
Manual at 1-1. 
The cooperative effort notwithstanding, gaps remained 
in the National Crossing Inventory thirty years later. See 
Letter from Norman Y. Mineta, U.S. Sec’y of Transp., to J. 
Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives 
(July 11, 2003), http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/final/rail04.pdf. 
The Department of Transportation urged Congress to pass 
legislation that would force states and railroads to fill the 
gaps. Id. Congress eventually responded by passing the Rail 
Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432, 122 
Stat. 4848. This Act requires states and railroads to 
independently submit information to the Secretary of 
Transportation on a regular basis. Significantly, the Act 
codified the submission requirements in separate places: the 
state-reporting requirement in 23 U.S.C. § 130(l) and the 
railroad-reporting requirement in 49 U.S.C. § 20160.  
As noted above, the record in this case contains two 
reports submitted to the National Crossing Inventory after the 
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passage of the Rail Safety Improvement Act in 2008. Both 
were submitted in 2010, one by the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, the other by Norfolk Southern. J.A. 995–98. 
The question, again, is whether they were collected or 
compiled pursuant to § 130. 
We conclude that after the 2008 Act, state-submitted 
reports are collected pursuant to § 130, but railroad-submitted 
reports are not. As a result, only state reports are privileged 
under the first part of § 409. Our conclusion is textually 
based: states must submit crossing reports to the national 
inventory under 23 U.S.C. § 130(l) (which § 409 references), 
while railroads must submit under 49 U.S.C. § 20160 (which 
§ 409 does not reference). State reports are thus collected 
―pursuant to section[] 130,‖ and railroad reports are not. 
Congress could have placed the railroad-reporting 
requirement in § 130 alongside the state requirement—in that 
case, railroad reports would be similarly privileged. But 
Congress instead chose to place the requirement in a different 
title of the United States Code. We regard that drafting choice 
as meaningful. Congress may well have had a stronger 
interest in protecting states, rather than railroads, from 
litigation. See Guillen, 537 U.S. at 147 (indicating that the 
primary goal of § 409 is to protect ―state and local 
governments‖). Whatever the reason, the text is plain. 
Accordingly, the 2010 Pennsylvania report is privileged 
under the first part of § 409 and the 2010 Norfolk Southern 
report is not. 
The record also contains seven reports submitted prior 
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to the passage of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008—
some submitted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
others by various railroads including Norfolk Southern. At 
first blush, the analysis is straightforward. Neither 23 U.S.C. 
§ 130(l) nor 49 U.S.C. § 20160 existed before 2008. States 
and railroads voluntarily participated in the National Crossing 
Inventory, so they did not submit reports pursuant to § 130 or 
any other statute. Even so, a few factors complicate the 
analysis.  
The first complication is that § 130(d) has long 
required states to maintain statewide inventories of railroad 
crossings. State inventories are thus ―compiled . . . pursuant 
to section[] 130‖ and so are privileged under § 409. To be 
sure, the pre-2008 reports in this case are from the national 
inventory. But states presumably rely on their own 
inventories when submitting reports to the national inventory. 
It is therefore possible that the pre-2008 Pennsylvania reports 
from the national inventory either were originally collected 
pursuant to § 130 or rely on data originally collected pursuant 
to § 130.
7
 
                                           
7
 Another complication is that some states meet their 
duty to create a state inventory by participating in the national 
inventory. See 1996 Manual at 1-1. This means that for some 
states, the privileged state inventories are their submissions to 
the national inventory. In that case, the reports from the 
national inventory might be privileged. We need not take on 
this issue because Pennsylvania has its own crossing 
 24 
 
The second complication is that before the 2008 Act, 
railroads often submitted crossing reports directly to the 
states. The states used the railroad reports to create their 
inventories and then passed them along to the national 
inventory. See 1996 Manual at 4-1. Such railroad reports 
were thus ―collected‖ by the states ―pursuant to section[] 
130.‖ Again, the pre-2008 railroad reports in this case are 
from the national inventory, but it is possible that the 
Commonwealth originally collected these reports to create its 
own inventory pursuant to § 130(d). 
These complications raise the following question: Do 
reports originally collected pursuant to § 130(d)—and 
therefore privileged under § 409—lose the privilege when 
voluntarily submitted by a state to the federal government? 
Zimmerman contends that the answer is found in Guillen. 
There, the county sheriff prepared an accident report after a 
deadly car crash. 537 U.S. at 136–40. The county public 
works department later acquired the report and used it to 
apply for funding under 23 U.S.C. § 152, which was one of 
the statutes listed in § 409 at the time. The Court concluded 
that the report was privileged in the hands of the public works 
department because the department collected it pursuant to 
§ 152. Id. at 144–46. The Court nevertheless concluded that 
the same report was not privileged in the hands of the sheriff 
because he did not collect it pursuant to any statute listed in 
                                                                                              
inventory. See Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 
Grade Crossing Electronic Document Management System 
(2012), https://www.dot14.state.pa.us/gcedmsweb/home.jsp.  
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§ 409. Id.  
Guillen indicates that the question is whether the 
immediate source of the documents—here, the Federal 
Railroad Administration—―collected‖ them ―pursuant to 
sections 130, 144, and 148 of [Title 23].‖ 23 U.S.C. § 409. 
But there is one important difference between the case before 
us and Guillen. The pre-2008 reports in our case might have 
been originally collected pursuant to § 130(d), whereas the 
report in Guillen was not originally collected pursuant to any 
statute listed in § 409. See 537 U.S. at 144–46. The Eighth 
Circuit has suggested that this difference is meaningful. See 
Robertson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 954 F.2d 1433, 1435 (8th 
Cir. 1992) (excluding a newspaper article that relied on 
privileged data to prevent ―circumvent[ing] the purpose of the 
statute‖). 
We need not decide this difficult question. Norfolk 
Southern bears the burden of proving that the privilege 
applies. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 385 
n.15. And it has failed to show that the seven national reports 
from before 2008 were ever ―collected . . . pursuant to 
section[] 130.‖ As we have pointed out, it is certainly possible 
that the reports either were originally collected pursuant to 
§ 130(d) or relied on data collected pursuant to § 130(d). But 
Norfolk Southern has offered no evidence that they were, and 
we construe the available evidence in the light most favorable 
to Zimmerman. As a result, we conclude that the District 
Court improperly excluded the seven pre-2008 crossing 
reports at the summary-judgment stage. 
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Although eight crossing reports are not covered by the 
first part of the privilege, they will still be inadmissible if they 
fall within the second part—that is, if they were ―compiled or 
collected . . . for the purpose of developing any highway 
safety construction improvement project which may be 
implemented utilizing Federal-aid highway funds.‖ 23 U.S.C. 
§ 409. We turn to this second part. 
There are two plausible interpretations of the relevant 
language in § 409. The broad interpretation is that a report 
was ―collected . . . for the purpose of developing any highway 
safety construction improvement project‖ if the agency 
collected the report with the understanding that someone 
might use it to improve highway safety in a later construction 
project.
8
 The narrow interpretation is that a report was 
collected for the statutory purpose if the agency collected it 
with the intent to use it for a particular construction project. 
In short, the broad interpretation would privilege any 
document that was collected to improve highway safety—
such as reports in a database—while the narrow interpretation 
would privilege only those documents that were collected for 
a particular project.  
We follow the Supreme Court’s example and adopt the 
narrow interpretation. See Guillen, 537 U.S. at 144–45 
                                           
8
 Despite the surfeit of modifiers, we interpret the 
phrase ―highway safety construction improvement project‖ to 
mean simply a construction project that improves highway 
safety. 
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(noting two plausible interpretations of a separate clause in 
§ 409 and adopting the ―narrower view‖). First, ―statutes 
establishing evidentiary privileges must be construed 
narrowly because privileges impede the search for the truth.‖ 
Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 386 
(recognizing ―the general constructional rule that evidentiary 
privileges should be narrowly construed‖). 
Furthermore, the narrow interpretation is more faithful 
to the text. The broad interpretation renders much of § 409 
redundant: if the second part privileges any document that 
might be used to improve highway safety in a later 
construction project, there would be no need for the first part 
to privilege documents ―compiled or collected for the purpose 
of identifying, evaluating, or planning the safety enhancement 
of potential accident sites, hazardous roadway conditions, or 
railway-highway crossings.‖ After all, these specific purposes 
all deal with information that might be used to improve safety 
in a later project. So every document that is privileged under 
the first part would also be privileged under the second part. 
We eschew the broad interpretation to avoid redundancy. See 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (―[T]he 
Court will avoid a reading which renders some words 
altogether redundant.‖); Ki Se Lee v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 218, 
223 (3d Cir. 2004) (recognizing ―the goal of avoiding 
surplusage in construing a statute‖). 
And the privilege uses different verbs in the first and 
second parts—―identifying, evaluating, or planning‖ in the 
first and ―developing‖ in the second. The first part seems to 
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privilege documents that deal with both potential and actual 
projects, while the second part appears to privilege only those 
documents that deal with actual projects. Or to put it another 
way, the second part privileges documents prepared when the 
agency already has a construction project in mind—and not 
simply documents that might be used to plan later projects.  
We conclude that the second part of § 409 excludes 
only those documents that were collected for a particular 
highway-safety construction project. Here, there is no 
indication that the Diller Avenue reports were collected for a 
particular project—instead, they were collected to establish a 
national database that might be used in future projects. The 
second part of § 409 does not apply. 
In sum, Zimmerman has nine crossing reports that 
suggest the Norfolk Southern train was going too fast when it 
entered the Diller Avenue crossing. The District Court 
excluded all nine reports under § 409. It should, however, 
have excluded only the 2010 Pennsylvania report. We now 
consider Zimmerman’s other evidence of excessive speed. 
3. The District Court improperly excluded nine 
accident reports. 
Zimmerman obtained ten Department of 
Transportation accident reports. The reports cover accidents 
that occurred at the Diller Avenue crossing over the past few 
decades, from a minor collision in 1975 to Zimmerman’s 
crash in 2008. The reports describe the conditions of the 
accident—weather, number of injuries, time of day, and so 
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on. And they list the classification of the track at the crossing: 
four reports state that the track was Class 2, one that it was 
Class 3, and five—all from the 1970s—that it was Class 1. 
The ten reports provide at least mixed evidence that the 
crossing was Class 1 and thus that the Norfolk Southern train 
was speeding. Even so, the District Court excluded the reports 
based on another evidentiary privilege: that contained in 49 
U.S.C. § 20903.
9
 This statute states in part: 
No part of an accident or incident report filed 
by a railroad carrier under section 20901 of 
[Title 49] . . . may be used in a civil action for 
damages resulting from a matter mentioned in 
the report. 
The parties agree that the accident reports were ―filed 
by a railroad carrier‖ under 49 U.S.C. § 20901. But 
Zimmerman argues that the privilege excludes only the report 
of his accident, not the nine other reports. His argument is 
textual: the privilege does not exclude accident reports from 
all civil cases. It merely excludes reports from civil cases that 
result ―from a matter mentioned in the report.‖ In 
Zimmerman’s view, his ―civil action for damages‖ arose from 
the accident mentioned in his report, but it did not arise from 
the accidents mentioned in the remaining nine reports. We 
agree that these reports fall outside the privilege. 
                                           
9
 The District Court also relied on 49 C.F.R. 
§ 225.7(b), but this regulation merely repeats the § 20903 
statutory privilege. 
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Norfolk Southern urges us to broadly interpret the term 
―matter.‖ In Norfolk Southern’s view, ―matter mentioned in 
the report‖ does not simply mean ―the accident mentioned in 
the report,‖ as Zimmerman implicitly argues. It also means 
―the location mentioned in the report.‖ The privilege 
therefore excludes all ten reports, since Zimmerman’s lawsuit 
is ―a civil action for damages resulting from a matter‖—or 
location, the Diller Avenue crossing—―mentioned in the 
report[s].‖ This argument is unpersuasive because Norfolk 
Southern takes the word ―matter‖ completely out of context. 
The phrase ―damages resulting from‖ appears directly before 
the word ―matter,‖ indicating that a ―matter‖ is the event that 
caused the harm discussed in the report. See Lee v. Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), No. 3:10-cv-00392, 2012 WL 
130267, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 17, 2012) (holding that 
§ 20903 does not apply to prior accident reports at the same 
crossing). We conclude that § 20903 excludes the report of 
Zimmerman’s accident but not the nine other reports. 
Norfolk Southern also argues that the § 409 privilege 
excludes the accident reports. Again, the privilege has two 
parts. The first part excludes reports collected to identify, 
evaluate, or plan ―the safety enhancement of potential 
accident sites, hazardous roadway conditions, or railway-
highway crossings, pursuant to sections 130, 144, and 148 of 
[Title 23].‖ This part plainly does not apply because the 
accident reports were collected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 
§ 20901—not pursuant to any section of Title 23. 
The second part of § 409 excludes reports if they were 
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collected to develop ―any highway safety construction 
improvement project which may be implemented utilizing 
Federal-aid highway funds.‖ As we concluded above, the 
language excludes only those documents that were collected 
for a particular highway-safety construction project. Like the 
reports in the National Crossing Inventory, accident reports 
are collected for a variety of reasons. One reason is to provide 
data for future safety projects. In most cases, however, 
accident reports are not collected for a particular highway-
safety construction project. Nor does Norfolk Southern point 
to any evidence that the Diller Avenue accident reports were 
collected for a particular project. Therefore, nine of the ten 
accident reports are admissible. 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that most of the 
crossing reports and accident reports are admissible. These 
reports suggest that the speed limit at the crossing was ten 
miles per hour or, equivalently, that the track was Class 1. 
That said, Zimmerman’s claim is far from a slam-dunk. Other 
evidence suggests that the track was Class 2 or Class 3. 
Norfolk Southern claims that it reclassified the track but 
failed to update the crossing reports. This claim is consistent 
with the accident reports—the most recent reports list the 
track as Class 2 or Class 3. But acceptance or rejection of 
Norfolk Southern’s explanation is the province of a jury. For 
now, the conflicting evidence results in Zimmerman’s 
excessive-speed claim surviving summary judgment. 
 32 
 
4. Zimmerman’s alternative claim of track 
misclassification is preempted. 
Zimmerman advances an alternative argument. If the 
track was in fact classified as Class 2 or Class 3, Zimmerman 
claims that Norfolk Southern should be liable for 
misclassification. According to Zimmerman, the limited sight 
distance imposed a duty on Norfolk Southern to classify the 
track as Class 2 or higher. 
The first question—and, as it turns out, the only 
question—is whether Zimmerman’s alternative claim avoids 
preemption. Zimmerman argues that Norfolk Southern 
violated a federal standard of care. See 49 U.S.C. 
§ 20106(b)(1)(A). He points to 49 C.F.R. pt. 213, which 
contains regulations for each class of tracks. But none of the 
regulations discuss track visibility. Zimmerman curiously 
cites two regulations that have nothing to do with visibility. 
See 49 C.F.R. §§ 234.203 (setting standards for control 
circuits), 234.225 (regulating the activation of warning 
systems). He also points to a regulation in Title 23 that 
mentions the term ―sight distance.‖ 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(E). 
But this regulation merely states that a flashing signal might 
be necessary if the sight distance is ―unusually restricted.‖ It 
does not require railroads to select a track class based on sight 
distance—nor does any regulation establish the sight distance 
necessary for each track class. Quite simply, no relevant 
federal standard of care exists. 
Despite the absence of a federal standard of care, 
Zimmerman may still avoid preemption if his claim falls 
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outside the scope of the original FRSA preemption provision. 
See 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2). As we have previously made 
clear, state claims are within the scope of this provision if 
federal regulations ―cover‖ or ―substantially subsume‖ the 
subject matter of the claims. Strozyk, 358 F.3d at 273 (citing 
49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2); Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664). The 
regulations must do more than ―touch upon or relate to that 
subject matter.‖ Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
The regulations in 49 C.F.R. pt. 213 subsume 
Zimmerman’s misclassification claim. These regulations 
establish varying requirements for each class of tracks—
governing everything from gage, alinement, and elevation, to 
crossties, curve speed, and rail joints. See 49 C.F.R. 
§§ 213.53 (explaining the proper method for measuring 
gage), 213.55 (creating alinement standards), 213.57 
(establishing the maximum speed based on track elevation 
and curvature), 213.109 (requiring more crossties for higher 
track classes), 213.121 (noting that rail joints must ―be of a 
structurally sound design‖).  
The regulations are part of a broad scheme to 
standardize railroad tracks. Admittedly, there is no regulation 
that classifies tracks based on sight distance. But the breadth 
of the scheme implies a decision not to classify on that basis. 
At the very least, it implies that the federal government did 
not want states to decide how tracks would be classified. We 
doubt that the federal government would create a detailed 
system with the expectation that states would impose extra 
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classification requirements—especially given the risk that the 
requirements would vary from state to state. This regulatory 
scheme preempts Zimmerman’s misclassification claim. 
B 
Zimmerman’s second claim is that Norfolk Southern 
failed to maintain a safe crossing area. As before, we must 
address the threshold question of preemption. We then 
consider whether Zimmerman produced sufficient evidence to 
avoid summary judgment. 
1. Zimmerman’s claim of failure to maintain a 
safe crossing area is not preempted. 
Zimmerman makes two allegations in support of his 
unsafe-crossing claim. The first is that Norfolk Southern 
negligently maintained the crossing devices at Diller 
Avenue—in particular, ―the sign that warned of the 
approaching crossing was covered by tree branches, the 
pavement markings no longer existed, and the crossbucks had 
been allowed to fall into disrepair.‖ Appellant’s Br. at 43. 
Zimmerman’s second allegation is that Norfolk Southern 
failed to provide adequate sight distance.
10
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 Zimmerman also alleges that Norfolk Southern 
violated this duty by failing to provide flashing lights at the 
crossing. As we conclude in Part III.C below, the FRSA 
preemption provision bars claims of inadequate crossing 
devices. 
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Strozyk is directly on point. There, we considered a 
claim for wrongful death resulting from a crash at a railroad 
crossing. 358 F.3d at 270. The decedent’s estate alleged that 
the railroad had failed to keep the crossing safe. We 
interpreted what is now subsection (a) of the FRSA 
preemption provision and explained that ―[a] railroad may 
still be liable for other negligent conduct, such as the failure 
to maintain a working crossing arm . . . .‖ Id. at 276 (quoting 
Evans Timber Co. v. Cent. of Ga. R.R. Co., 519 S.E.2d 706, 
709–10 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)); see also Terrell v. Soo Line 
R.R. Co., No. 2:04-cv-095, 2005 WL 4882750, at *7 (S.D. 
Ind. Sept. 1, 2005) (noting that preemption would improperly 
insulate railroads ―even if the crossbucks had fallen to the 
ground and were unobservable by a passing motorist‖). We 
also concluded that 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3) does not 
preempt sight-distance claims, even though the regulation 
mentions ―unusually restricted sight distance‖ as a factor that 
might require states to install flashing lights. We reasoned 
that ―the plain language‖ of the regulation ―indicates that the 
subject matter is the adequacy of warning devices, not the 
considerations involved in choosing them or state negligence 
law more broadly. . . . The bare mention of [conditions such 
as sight distance] does not indicate an intent to regulate those 
conditions.‖ Strozyk, 358 F.3d at 273. 
The 2007 FRSA amendment did not supersede 
Strozyk,
11
 and thus both parts of Zimmerman’s unsafe-
crossing claim avoid preemption. See id. at 277 (―[The 
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 See supra Part II. 
 36 
 
plantiffs’] claims that [the defendant] failed to maintain a safe 
grade crossing . . . and relatedly failed to ensure clear sight 
lines of oncoming trains are not preempted.‖). Even if Strozyk 
were not binding, Zimmerman’s negligent-maintenance 
allegation would avoid preemption because 49 C.F.R. 
§ 234.245 creates a federal standard of care governing the 
maintenance of crossbucks. 49 U.S.C. § 20106(b)(1)(A); see 
49 C.F.R. §§ 234.245 (―Each sign mounted on a highway-rail 
grade crossing signal post shall be maintained in good 
condition and be visible to the highway user.‖), 234.3 
(indicating that railroads are responsible for maintaining signs 
under § 234.245).
12
 
2. Zimmerman produced sufficient evidence that 
Norfolk Southern failed to maintain the 
crossing devices and that the sight distance 
was inadequate. 
The District Court agreed that at least part of 
Zimmerman’s second claim avoided preemption. The Court 
nevertheless granted summary judgment on his entire claim, 
concluding that he had failed to satisfy the elements of 
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 Zimmerman also produced a document from the 
Federal Railroad Administration that suggested the necessary 
sight distance was 376 feet. See J.A. 697. This document, 
however,  does not create a standard of care for preemption 
purposes because the document is not ―a regulation or order 
issued by the Secretary of Transportation.‖ 49 U.S.C. 
§ 20106. 
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negligence. In particular, the Court concluded that Norfolk 
Southern did not have ―a duty to remove a privately owned 
building that potentially obscure[s] sight lines.‖ Zimmerman 
v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. 10-cv-02267, 2011 WL 3625039, at 
*12 n.9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2011). Zimmerman argues that the 
District Court ignored his inadequate-maintenance allegation 
and misconstrued Pennsylvania law on the question of sight 
distance. We agree with Zimmerman—both parts of his 
second claim survive summary judgment. 
We first consider Zimmerman’s allegation that the 
warnings had fallen into disrepair. The well-worn elements of 
common-law negligence are, of course, duty, breach, 
causation, and damages. Under Pennsylvania law, railroads 
have a duty to maintain railroad warning devices. Geelen v. 
Pa. R.R. Co., 161 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. 1960) (―A railroad 
company is under a duty to maintain a public crossing in a 
state of good repair.‖); see also Conner, 263 F.2d at 946 
(stating that under Pennsylvania law, a railroad might be 
liable for failing to maintain crossing devices); Buchecker v. 
Reading Co., 412 A.2d 147, 153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) 
(considering ―evidence that the signal was not operating at the 
time‖ of the accident).13 
                                           
13
 Judge Aldisert invokes the occupied-crossing rule to 
argue that Norfolk Southern did not have a duty to maintain 
the crossing devices. Neither party has mentioned this rule, 
and for good reason: it does not apply here. As the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained, the rule applies 
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According to Zimmerman, Norfolk Southern breached 
this duty because ―the sign that warned of the approaching 
crossing was covered by tree branches, the pavement 
markings no longer existed, and the crossbucks had been 
allowed to fall into disrepair.‖ Appellant’s Br. at 43. Viewed 
in the light most favorable to Zimmerman, the record 
supports these allegations.  
Photographs suggest that there once was a white line 
north of the crossing, but that the line had faded by the time 
                                                                                              
only when ―an engine or a draft of cars is on the crossing or 
street or highway and is visible to such highway users.‖ Cella 
v. Pa. R. Co., 70 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. 1950) (emphasis added). 
When both elements are met, ―the presence of the engine or 
draft on the crossing or street [is] sufficient warning to 
[motorists] of the dangers incident thereto.‖Id. But a train’s 
presence does not provide ―sufficient warning‖ when it enters 
the crossing only after motorists have reached the point of no 
return. See Krentz v. Consol. Rail Corp., 910 A.2d 20, 28 n.10 
(Pa. 2006) (noting that, despite the occupied-crossing rule, 
―the law does impose a duty on railroads to warn of 
approaching trains‖).  
Here, the train rushed into view at the last second. 
Because the train was not visible in time for Zimmerman to 
avoid the accident, see J.A. 687, the rule does not apply. A 
contrary holding would imply that a train racing down the 
tracks at double the speed limit would avoid liability 
whenever a motorist ran into it—even when the train’s speed 
effectively prevented motorists from avoiding the collision. 
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of Zimmerman’s collision. See J.A. 508, 716, 983.14 Other 
photographs indicate that tree branches covered both the 
crossbuck and the yellow advanced warning sign. For 
example, a 2008 photograph shows that tree branches covered 
the yellow warning sign—although the picture is too dark and 
grainy to be conclusive. See id. 516. And a series of 
photographs from 2011 show that a tree standing next to the 
warning sign partially obscures the crossbuck—at least from 
the perspective of someone who is more than 250 feet away. 
See id. at 719–20.15 Both parties cite an expert’s statement 
that tree branches covered the crossbuck, see Appellant’s Br. 
at 43 (citing J.A. 690); Appellee’s Br. at 31 n.11 (same), but 
                                           
14
 There is no painted line in a 2008 photograph, but 
there is a line in a 2011 photograph. See J.A. 508, 716, 983. 
Of course, subsequent remedial measures are inadmissible to 
prove negligence. See Fed. R. Evid. 407. Yet the paint in the 
2011 photograph suggests that the pavement was painted 
before the 2008 accident, but that the marking faded and 
required a fresh coat of paint. This is not the only possible 
inference from the facts, but it is a ―reasonable inference,‖ 
which is all that is necessary at this stage. InterVest, Inc. v. 
Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(explaining the standard for summary judgment). 
15
 According to Judge Aldisert, Zimmerman did not 
argue that tree branches covered the crossbuck—only that the 
crossbuck had fallen into disrepair. But if Norfolk Southern in 
fact allowed tree branches to cover the crossbuck, it seems 
accurate to say that it ―allowed‖ the crossbuck ―to fall into 
disrepair.‖ Appellant’s Br. at 43. 
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the expert’s report mysteriously contains no such statement. 
Either way, a reasonable jury could accept Zimmerman’s 
narrative based on the photographs. 
Norfolk Southern also argues that there is insufficient 
evidence of causation. Darkness had fallen by the time 
Zimmerman began riding home. He may well have hit the 
train even if the obscuring branches had been pruned and the 
white line had been repainted. Yet in his deposition, 
Zimmerman said that he had crossed the track many times 
before the accident and that he believed the crossing was 
inactive. J.A. 235 (―[I] did not know that that track had a 
regular train on it. I have never seen a train on that track . . . . 
I certainly wasn’t expecting—to my knowledge, it was an 
unused track.‖). From this testimony—and from the other 
evidence that the crossing was poorly maintained—it is 
reasonable to infer that state of disrepair at least contributed 
to his belief that the crossing was inactive. See InterVest, Inc. 
v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(―When analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court 
must view the facts and any reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
summary judgment.‖). As a result, it is also reasonable to 
infer that on the night of the accident, he approached the 
crossing with less caution than he otherwise would have. 
We now turn to the allegation that Norfolk Southern 
failed to provide adequate sight distance. This allegation also 
survives summary judgment. Under Pennsylvania law, 
railroads have a duty to ensure that motorists are able to see 
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approaching trains. See Fallon v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 279 
A.2d 164, 167 (Pa. 1971). The District Court cited our 
opinion in Strozyk and concluded that the duty merely 
requires railroads to remove excess vegetation, as there is no 
―duty to modify or remove a privately owned building which 
is located off the railroad’s right of way.‖ Zimmerman, No. 
10-cv-02267, 2011 WL 3625039, at *12 n.9 (citing Strozyk, 
358 F.3d at 276–77). 
But Pennsylvania courts have held that the duty 
extends well beyond the removal of vegetation. In Johnson v. 
Pa. R.R. Co., 160 A.2d 694 (Pa. 1960), a motorist’s view was 
obstructed by buildings, utility poles, and a hedge. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded: 
A railroad company may, in some instances 
have no choice as to location of crossings, . . . 
but where, as here, physical conditions visually 
blanket the speeding train until several short 
seconds before it sweeps, like a steel and iron 
tornado, into a crossing, a due responsibility for 
the safety of mankind dictates that something be 
done to alert the public of the omnipresent 
danger . . . . 
Id. at 697. In Fallon, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found 
sufficient evidence of negligence where the plaintiffs’ view 
was obstructed by a building. 279 A.2d at 167. According to 
the court, ―it was difficult if not impossible to gain an 
adequate view of the west-bound track without putting one’s 
car in or dangerously close to the swath of an oncoming 
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train.‖ Id; see also Buchecker, 412 A.2d at 156–57 (―[I]t is 
proper for the jury to take into consideration the physical 
conditions at the crossing . . . [and] the nature of the 
surroundings.‖) (citing Cummings v. Pa. R.R., 151 A. 590, 
591 (Pa. 1930)). To be sure, no Pennsylvania court has 
expressly held that railroads have a clear duty to modify 
private buildings. But cases such as Johnson and Fallon have 
indicated that the jury should consider privately owned 
buildings when deciding whether the railroad breached its 
duty to provide adequate sight distance. 
We conclude that the building in this case is relevant 
in deciding whether Norfolk Southern provided adequate 
sight distance. The jury can decide whether Norfolk Southern 
should have asked the building’s owner to remove a sign that 
was along Diller Avenue. Norfolk Southern even had a policy 
for doing so: ―If an obstruction is located off the right-of-way, 
the owners of the land containing the obstruction should be 
contacted personally and an appeal made to the landowner to 
remove the obstruction. The personal contact should be 
followed up with a letter, with a copy to the appropriate state 
agency.‖ J.A. 1051. If the appeal fails, ―the matter should be 
referred to the Law Department for guidance,‖ id., 
presumably to decide whether to use eminent domain under 
15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1511 (allowing public utility corporations 
such as railroads to use eminent domain).  
The jury can also decide whether Norfolk Southern 
should have enlisted the help of the Commonwealth or used 
eminent domain. And if the jury decides that Norfolk 
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Southern breached its duty, Norfolk Southern’s policy and 15 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1511 might be evidence of causation. They 
suggest that Norfolk Southern could have improved 
conditions at the crossing in a way that would have prevented 
the accident.
16
 
Zimmerman’s second claim is far from 
overwhelming—the evidence of disrepair is conflicting, and it 
is unclear whether Norfolk Southern’s inaction caused the 
                                           
16
 Judge Aldisert invokes the longstanding duty to 
―stop, look, and listen‖ and argues that Norfolk Southern did 
not have an obligation in this case to provide adequate sight 
distance. See Briach v. Pa. R.R. Co., 462 F.2d 266, 268 (3d 
Cir. 1972); 75 Pa. C.S. § 3341(a). Zimmerman supposedly 
violated this duty because he did not stop before crossing the 
tracks. This might be true, but Zimmerman’s negligence is a 
separate question. As the Pennsylvania Superior Court has 
explained, ―one who fails to stop, look, and listen will not be 
precluded from recovery where the failure is not negligent.‖ 
Buchecker v. Reading Co., 412 A.2d 147, 154 (Pa. Super. 
1979) (emphasis added).  
The District Court explicitly refrained from deciding 
whether Zimmerman was negligent. Zimmerman, 2011 WL 
3625039, at *21 n.34 (―I do not need to consider defendant’s 
additional arguments that plaintiff was comparatively 
negligent by failing to comply with Pennsylvania law.‖). And 
neither side has addressed the question of Zimmerman’s 
negligence on appeal. We therefore refuse to affirm on these 
grounds. 
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sight distance to remain inadequate. All the same, we must 
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Zimmerman. There is sufficient evidence of each element to 
allow the claim to go forward. 
C 
Zimmerman’s third and final claim is that Norfolk 
Southern was negligent per se for violating various 
requirements in 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b).
17
 In particular, 
subsection (b)(3)(i) states that crossings with limited sight 
distance and high train speeds must have ―adequate warning 
devices,‖ defined in the statute as automatic gates and 
flashing lights. And subsection (b)(1) states that all ―traffic 
control devices‖ must comply with the Manual on Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices. Zimmerman asserts that Norfolk 
Southern violated both provisions. The District Court decided 
that the claim was preempted.  
We agree that Zimmerman’s third claim is preempted. 
For starters, neither regulation creates a federal standard of 
care. See 49 U.S.C. § 20106(b)(1)(A). We analyze the 
regulations separately. Subsection (b)(3)(i)(C) states: 
                                           
17
 Zimmerman also identifies a number of internal 
rules that Norfolk Southern supposedly violated. These 
supposed violations do not help Zimmerman avoid 
preemption because he fails to show the internal rules were 
―created pursuant to a regulation or order.‖ 49 U.S.C. 
§ 20106(b)(1)(B). 
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Adequate warning devices . . . on any project 
where Federal-aid funds participate in the 
installation of the devices are to include 
automatic gates with flashing light signals when 
. . . the following conditions exist: . . . High 
Speed train operation combined with limited 
sight distance at either single or multiple track 
crossings. 
Zimmerman argues that subsection (b)(3) creates a federal 
standard of care—one that requires Norfolk Southern to 
install automatic gates and flashing lights—because the sight 
distance at the Diller Avenue crossing is limited. 
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have rejected similar 
arguments. See Grade, 676 F.3d at 686–87 (concluding that 
23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3) and (4) preempt claims against 
railroads for installing inadequate warning devices at railroad 
crossings); Henning, 530 F.3d at 1215 (same). Subsection 
(b)(3) does not impose on railroads an ongoing duty—instead, 
it ―displace[s] state and private decisionmaking authority.‖ 
Henning, 530 F.3d at 1212 (quoting Easterwood, 607 U.S. at 
670) (internal quotation marks omitted). More importantly, 
subsection (b)(3) ―place[s] the responsibility for 
implementing adequate warning devices on the State, thereby 
preempting any cause of action alleging a railroad failed to 
properly install an adequate warning device.‖ Grade 676 F.3d 
at 686. Railroads cannot, ―as a matter of law, fail to comply‖ 
with subsection (b)(3). Id. (quoting Henning, 530 F.3d at 
1215). 
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We find this reasoning persuasive. The 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania installed crossbucks at the 
Diller Avenue crossing with the use of federal funds and the 
help of the crossing’s previous owner. Norfolk Southern, as 
the current owner, has a duty to maintain the crossing 
devices. See Strozyk, 358 F.3d at 276. But the Commonwealth 
is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the devices comply 
with subsection (b)(3). As a result, subsection (b)(3) does not 
impose on Norfolk Southern a federal standard of care. 
The same is true of subsection (b)(1). Zimmerman tries 
to avoid Grade and Henning by asserting that Norfolk 
Southern also violated subsection (b)(1): 
All traffic control devices proposed shall 
comply with the latest edition of the Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and 
Highways supplemented to the extent 
applicable by State standards. 
Zimmerman argues that subsection (b)(1) imposes on 
railroads an ongoing duty to update their crossing devices. 
Norfolk Southern violated this supposed duty by failing to 
update the crossbucks to comply with the latest Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices. This argument is 
inconsistent with the text, which requires that ―proposed‖ 
devices—not already existing devices—comply with the 
manual. Moreover, subsection (b)(1) is part of the same 
scheme as subsection (b)(3). Both subsections create rules 
that states must obey to receive federal funds. Neither 
imposes on railroads a standard of care. 
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Absent a federal standard, Zimmerman can avoid 
preemption only if there are no federal regulations that cover 
the subject matter of his inadequate-device claim. 49 U.S.C. 
§ 20106(a)(2). Unfortunately for Zimmerman, the Supreme 
Court has already concluded that subsections (b)(3) and (b)(4) 
cover the subject matter of such claims. See Shanklin, 529 
U.S. at 352–53 (citing Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 670). These 
regulations are preemptive because they ―displace state and 
private decisionmaking authority by establishing a federal-
law requirement that certain protective devices be installed or 
federal approval obtained.‖ Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 670. 
Zimmerman tries to escape preemption by citing the Supreme 
Court’s statement that subsection (b)(1) ―does not pre-empt 
state tort actions.‖ Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 352. But this 
language does not save Zimmerman’s claim—subsections 
(b)(3) and (b)(4) clearly preempt his inadequate-device claim. 
It is of no consequence whether subsection (b)(1) does the 
same. 
Zimmerman is unable to avoid preemption by asserting 
that Norfolk Southern installed the wrong warning devices—
even though he was able to avoid preemption by asserting 
that Norfolk Southern failed to maintain them. See supra Part 
III.B.1. While it may seem that this scheme is internally 
inconsistent, it is nonetheless the scheme Congress has 
established. 
IV 
Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment on Zimmerman’s first and second 
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claims but affirm its grant of summary judgment on 
Zimmerman’s third claim. 
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ALDISERT, Circuit Judge, Dissenting, and Concurring in 
Part 
 
 Robert Zimmerman appeals from an order of the 
District Court, which granted Norfolk Southern Corporation‟s 
motion for summary judgment. He had filed a civil complaint 
against Norfolk Southern Corporation (“Norfolk Southern”) 
in the District Court seeking damages for injuries sustained 
when he abruptly applied his motorcycle brakes at a railroad 
crossing and flew over the motorcycle‟s handlebars, colliding 
with the side of a lead train engine proceeding over the 
crossing. He bottomed his personal injury claim against the 
railroad on (1) negligent failure to warn of an approaching 
train; (2) negligent failure to maintain a safe grade crossing 
area; and (3) negligence per se for violating various portions 
of 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b) (adequate warning devices). I 
would affirm the judgment of the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in its entirety. 
 
 Accordingly, I join that portion of the majority 
opinion that affirms the District Court‟s determination that 
Zimmerman‟s negligence per se claim, set forth above as the 
third issue, is preempted. I concur also in the majority‟s 
approach to analyzing the Federal Railroad Safety Act 
(“FRSA”) preemption provision, codified at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 20106. I am unable to agree with the majority‟s reversal of 
the judgment on the two other issues presented to us. I 
therefore join Parts II and III C of the majority opinion and 
dissent as to Parts III A and B.  
 
I. 
 
2 
 
 
On the evening of June 12, 2008, Robert Zimmerman 
was operating his motorcycle southward on Diller Avenue in 
New Holland, Pennsylvania. He was wearing a full-face 
helmet with a visor and was familiar with the Diller Avenue 
railroad crossing because he had traveled down Diller Avenue 
and through the crossing “hundreds” of times before this 
incident. App. 00230. At approximately 10 p.m. that evening, 
two locomotives owned by Norfolk Southern—Engine 5657 
and Engine 5656—approached Diller Avenue. The engineer, 
Douglas Eppley, and the conductor, Stephen Romberger, 
were stationed in the head of the lead locomotive, Engine 
5657. As the train entered the Diller Avenue crossing, 
Zimmerman, who had been traveling on his motorcycle 
approximately 30 to 35 miles per hour, abruptly applied his 
brakes and flew over the handlebars of his motorcycle. His 
body struck the side of the fuel tank portion of the lead 
engine. As a result of the collision, Zimmerman sustained 
extensive injuries and was airlifted to Lancaster General 
Hospital. He was subsequently transferred to a rehabilitation 
center, where he remained until his discharge in October 
2008. He was left partially paralyzed. 
 
Norfolk Southern operates the railroad crossing at 
Diller Avenue. The crossing protects southbound motorists 
with a crossbuck
1
 on the side of the road in accordance with 
the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices 
(“MUTCD”). This was a reflectorized crossbuck installed in 
                                              
1
 A crossbuck is an X-shaped sign that reads: “Railroad 
Crossing,” and “requires road users to yield the right-of-way 
to rail traffic at a highway-rail grade crossing.” U.S. Dept. of 
Transp. Fed. Highway Admin., Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices, 542 (2009).  
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1987. Norfolk Southern also placed a black-and-yellow 
railroad-grade crossing sign approximately 150 feet north of 
the crossing. The company neither possesses nor controls any 
land or property in the vicinity of the Diller Avenue crossing 
other than its right-of-way. 
 
Train conductor Romberger was positioned in the lead 
locomotive of a two-engine train. Positioned on the left side, 
he saw the motorcycle approaching when Zimmerman was 
approximately 50 feet from the crossing, and he realized that, 
“given Mr. Zimmerman‟s speed[,] . . . he was going to collide 
with us.” App. 00113. Zimmerman‟s body collided with the 
fuel tank of the lead engine of the train approximately 30 feet 
from its front leading edge. The crossing is only 29 feet wide. 
The lead engine, therefore, was already through the crossing 
at the time Zimmerman collided with the train.  
 
Zimmerman has no present recollection of the 
incident.
2
 Two independent witnesses, Seth Huyard and Chad 
Kaufman, who were traveling in a truck approximately 60 
feet behind Zimmerman on Diller Avenue, both “heard the 
train blowing its horn” as they approached the railroad 
                                              
2
 Because Zimmerman was unable to testify about the 
relevant aspects of the event, I reject the majority opinion‟s 
reference to his alleged observations before his collision with 
the side of the train. The majority opinion states that “[w]hen 
he was less than seventy-six feet away, he noticed that a train 
was approaching. He tried to stop, but his front brake locked 
and he flew over the handlebars, colliding headfirst with a 
locomotive.” Majority Opinion 2-3. In Zimmerman‟s 
deposition, he stated that he did not recall seeing the train on 
the night of the accident. App. 00236-00237. 
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crossing. App. 00520-00521. Huyard, the truck‟s driver, 
stated that “as the train entered the intersection the 
motorcycle rider appeared to apply his front brake causing 
him to go over the handlebars.” App. 00520. Kaufman, who 
was riding in the truck, saw “the train cross Diller Avenue. 
[He] then saw the motorcycle go into the side of the train.” 
App. 00521.  
 
At the time of the collision, each locomotive was 
equipped with a digital recording device, known as an Event 
Data Recorder (“EDR”), which recorded information such as 
speed and horn activation. According to the EDR, the train 
was traveling at approximately 24 miles per hour at the time 
of the collision. The EDR also recorded that the train horn 
was activated beginning at a point of approximately one-
quarter mile prior to the crossing and continued through the 
crossing, sounding for a total of 45 seconds. 
 
On May 14, 2010, Zimmerman filed a four-count civil 
complaint against Norfolk Southern. On March 31, 2011, 
Norfolk Southern filed a motion for summary judgment, 
which the Court granted on August 17, 2011. Zimmerman 
timely appealed.  
 
II. 
 
In reviewing a district court‟s grant of summary 
judgment, we exercise plenary review. See Gallo v. City of 
Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998). We apply the same 
test as a district court applies, see Waldorf v. Shuta, 896 F.2d 
723, 728 (3d Cir. 1990), and will affirm if “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Rule 56(a), Federal 
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Rules of Civil Procedure. Facts must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Monroe v. 
Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 206 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 
 
III. 
 
 Zimmerman offers a number of reasons in support of 
his contention that the District Court erred in granting the 
motion for summary judgment. He asserts that his claims of 
negligence based on (1) inadequate signals and (2) excessive 
speed are not preempted. He contends also that the District 
Court erred in finding that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists as to his claims of negligence based on a common-law 
duty the railroad owed to (3) maintain a reasonably safe 
crossing and (4) provide adequate sight distance. Finally, he 
argues that the District Court erred in holding that certain  
documents, relevant to his excessive speed allegation, were 
privileged. For the reasons that follow, I would affirm the 
District Court‟s judgment. 
 
I would conclude that the District Court properly held 
that Zimmerman‟s claims of negligence based on inadequate 
signals and excessive speed are preempted. With regard to 
Zimmerman‟s common-law claims that Norfolk Southern 
failed to maintain a reasonably safe crossing and provide 
adequate sight distance, I would furthermore conclude that 
the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment 
in favor of Norfolk Southern, because Zimmerman failed to 
establish a prima facie claim of negligence and therefore no 
genuine issue of material fact exists. Finally, I would 
conclude that the Court correctly held that the documents 
related to his excessive speed allegation were privileged. 
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Summary judgment was therefore appropriate and, as stated 
heretofore, I would affirm the entire District Court judgment. 
 
IV. 
 
For part of his negligence claims, Zimmerman alleges 
that Norfolk Southern failed to maintain a safe crossing at 
Diller Avenue. He alleges that the railroad negligently 
maintained the crossing devices, and that the railroad failed to 
provide adequate sight distance, thereby preventing him from 
seeing the train that he struck until it was too late for him to 
avoid the collision. We have long recognized that railroads 
have a duty to provide a safe crossing, including adequate 
sight distances. See Strozyk v. Norfolk S. Corp, 358 F.3d 
268, 277 (3d Cir. 2004) (“A railroad must „exercise ordinary 
care at a crossing by adopting a reasonably safe and effective 
method, commensurate with the dangers of a particular 
crossing, of warning travelers of the approach of the train.‟”) 
(quoting Nat‟l Freight v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 698 F. Supp. 
74, 78 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff‟d, 872 F.2d 413 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
Indeed, where “physical conditions visually blanket the 
speeding train until several short seconds before it sweeps . . . 
into a crossing, a due responsibility for the safety of mankind 
dictates that something be done to alert the public . . . above 
that of asking it to stop, look, and listen.” Johnson v. Penn. 
R.R. Co., 160 A.2d 694, 697 (Pa. 1960).  
 
At the same time, a motorist planning to drive through 
a crossing is required to respect the common law of 
Pennsylvania and the relevant statutes of that state. Thus, 
upon the sounding of the train‟s horn, Zimmerman had to 
obey the following provisions of 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3341(a): 
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Whenever any person driving a vehicle 
approaches a railroad grade crossing . . .  the 
driver of the vehicle shall stop within 50 feet 
but not less than 15 feet from the nearest rail of 
the railroad and shall not proceed until it can be 
done safely. The foregoing requirement shall 
apply upon the occurrence of . . .  the following 
circumstance[]: 
. . .  
 
(3) A railroad train approaching within 
approximately 1,500 feet of the highway 
crossing emits a signal audible from that 
distance and the railroad train, by reason of its 
speed or nearness to the crossing, is a hazard. 
 
Moreover, ruling case law of Pennsylvania teaches: 
When a motorist approaches a railroad crossing 
that is occupied by a train, whether the train is 
traveling or stationary, the only duties involved 
are those of the motorist, namely: 
 . . . 
 
(2) “to stop, look and listen before entering 
upon the crossing.”  
 
Krentz v. Consol. Rail Corp., 910 A.2d 20, 28 (Pa. 
2006) (emphasis added) (citing Hogg v. Bessemer & 
Lake Erie R.R. Co., 96 A.2d 879, 884 (Pa. 1953)). 
 
 Krentz was the Pennsylvania Supreme Court‟s latest 
application of the venerable Occupied Crossing Rule, which 
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“is as securely affixed to [Pennsylvania] jurisprudence as 
train tracks are to the land that they traverse.” Krentz, 910 
A.2d at 27. Under that rule, “„a railroad company cannot 
ordinarily be found negligent because it failed to station 
guards or light the car, or otherwise give warning of its 
presence in the highway,‟” id. (quoting Cella v. Pa. R.R. Co., 
70 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. 1950), and this rule applies regardless 
of whether the train is moving or stationary, id. at 27 n.9 
(citing Cella, 70 A.2d at 639). The train‟s presence in the 
crossing is “sufficient notice of its presence to warn any 
person using the highway with ordinary care.” Id. at 27.  
 
The duty to stop, look and listen before entering a 
crossing, particularly a crossing that is occupied, is best 
expressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court‟s statement in 
Serfas v. Lehigh and N.E. R. Co., 113 A. 370, 370-371 (Pa. 
1921): “The [plaintiff] openly violated the inflexible rule 
requiring the traveler to stop, look, and listen before entering 
upon a railroad track . . . . „It is not a rule of evidence, but a 
rule of law, peremptory, absolute and unbending and the jury 
can never be permitted to ignore it, to evade it, or to pare it 
away by distinctions and exceptions.‟” (quoting Pa. R.R. Co. 
v. Aiken, 18 A. 619, 620 (Pa. 1889)).  
 
The Occupied Crossing Rule has a long history in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, dating back to the Court‟s 
1938 opinion in Everetts v. Pa. R.R. Co., 198 A. 796 (Pa. 
1938) (per curiam). Although the rule arose during the era of 
contributory negligence, it has survived the 1978 adoption of 
the comparative negligence doctrine in Pennsylvania. See 
Krentz, 910 A.2d at 28 (stating that “„the enactment of the 
Comparative Negligence Act does not change the well 
established rule that negligence cannot be found where the 
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law does not impose a duty‟”) (quoting Sprenkel v. Consol. 
Rail Corp., 666 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Pa. Super. 1995)). 
 
 Zimmerman‟s allegation that the crossing devices were 
negligently maintained is a failure to warn claim. He argues 
that Norfolk Southern breached a duty to maintain railroad 
warning devices because “the sign that warned of the 
approaching crossing was covered by tree branches, the 
pavement markings no longer existed, and the crossbucks had 
been allowed to fall into disrepair.” Brief of Appellant 43. 
Because he contends that the railroad failed to warn him of 
the danger at the crossing, we must determine whether any 
duty to warn was in fact owed to him by the railroad given the 
circumstances of the accident. See Krentz, 910 A.2d at 28.  
 
Zimmerman, upon reaching the grade crossing, 
abruptly applied his brakes and flew over the handlebars of 
his motorcycle, striking a moving train. That moving train 
occupied the crossing at the time he struck it, triggering 
application of the Occupied Crossing Rule. As stated 
previously, a motorist approaching an occupied crossing has 
the duty to stop, look, and listen before entering the crossing; 
the railroad has no duty to warn of an occupied crossing. Id. 
As the Krentz Court notes in a footnote, railroads do in fact 
have a duty to warn of approaching trains. Id. at n.10. Here, 
however, the lead engine already occupied the crossing at the 
time Zimmerman struck it. He struck the train at a point 
approximately 30 feet from the front of its lead engine, at a 
crossing that is only 29 feet wide. This is neither a matter of 
contributory nor comparative negligence; rather, Zimmerman 
cannot maintain his negligent maintenance of crossing 
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devices claim because Norfolk Southern had no duty to warn 
of an occupied crossing.
3
 
 
Zimmerman‟s inadequate sight distance claim is also, 
at its core, a failure to warn claim. An adequate sight distance 
is one means of providing motorists with warning that a train 
is approaching. Here, as with the negligent maintenance of 
crossing devices allegation, Zimmerman cannot maintain his 
inadequate sight distance claim because the train that 
Zimmerman struck occupied the crossing, triggering 
application of the Occupied Crossing Rule. 
 
This issue is not controlled by controverted facts but 
by fundamental precepts of negligence, under which a 
plaintiff must first establish that a defendant does in fact have 
a duty. Here, application of the Occupied Crossing Rule 
would compel us to hold that summary judgment was 
appropriate because the railroad had no duty to warn of the 
presence of the train that occupied the crossing at Diller 
Avenue. Nevertheless, to address the specific points made by 
                                              
3
 The majority‟s footnote 13 states that the Occupied Crossing 
Rule does not apply because “[h]ere, the train rushed into 
view at the last second,” and “the train was not visible in time 
for Zimmerman to avoid the accident[.]” The train did indeed 
arrive at the crossing shortly before Zimmerman struck it, but 
it fully occupied the crossing at the moment of impact. As the 
majority states, railroads still have a duty to warn of 
approaching trains; here, the record before us shows that the 
lead engine‟s headlight was on “full” and the horn had been 
blowing for one-quarter mile, or 45 seconds, such that two 
people traveling 60 feet behind Zimmerman could hear the 
horn as the train approached the Diller Avenue crossing.  
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the majority, I now turn to the common-law duties to 
maintain a safe crossing and provide adequate sight distances.  
 
V. 
  
I would hold that the District Court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern because, 
even assuming that the railroad owed duties to Zimmerman 
under the circumstances of the accident, no genuine issue of 
material fact exists as to those duties.  
 
The District Court noted “that the Third Circuit in 
Strozyk held that § 646.214(b) only preempts claims 
regarding the adequacy of warning devices, and does not 
preempt the common-law duty to maintain a safe grade 
crossing.” App. 00032. The Court explained that “railroads 
continue to have the common-law duty „to provide a 
reasonably safe grade crossing,‟ „such as the duty to keep 
visibility at grade crossings free from obstructions.” Id. 
(quoting Strozyk, 358 F.3d at 276-277). I, along with the 
majority, agree with the District Court‟s conclusion that this 
claim was not preempted. Although the claim was not 
preempted, the District Court nevertheless granted Norfolk 
Southern‟s motion for summary judgment because 
Zimmerman had not made a prima facie claim for negligence. 
The Court determined that Zimmerman failed to establish that 
Norfolk Southern: (1) had a duty to remove a privately owned 
building, located off of the railroad‟s right-of-way, that 
potentially obscured sight lines; and (2) negligently failed to 
maintain a reasonably safe crossing. Accordingly, the District 
Court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
and that summary judgment was appropriate. Whereas the 
majority states that “[t]here is sufficient evidence of each 
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element to allow the claim to go forward,” Majority Opinion 
44, I disagree and would hold that the District Court correctly 
granted summary judgment.  
 
VI. 
 
In determining whether summary judgment was 
appropriate here, I must therefore determine whether any 
genuine issue of material fact exists as to Norfolk Southern‟s 
common-law duties of care. 
 
To establish a prima facie case for negligence under 
the common-law theory that Norfolk Southern failed to 
maintain a reasonably safe crossing by negligently 
maintaining the crossing devices and failing to provide 
adequate sight distance, Zimmerman had to adduce facts that 
demonstrate: (1) a duty or obligation recognized by law; (2) a 
breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the 
breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss suffered by 
him. See Rooney v. City of Phila., 623 F. Supp. 2d 644, 660 
(E.D. Pa. 2009).  
 
A. 
 
 Zimmerman asserts that Norfolk Southern allowed the 
warnings at the Diller Avenue crossing to fall into disrepair, 
breaching its duty to maintain warning devices at the 
crossing. According to the majority, the record supports his 
allegations that the warning sign was covered by tree 
branches, that pavement markings no longer existed, and that 
the crossbucks had been permitted to fall into disrepair. 
Majority Opinion 38. With regard to the tree branches, 
Zimmerman has failed to put forth competent evidence 
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demonstrating that the foliage blocked his view of the 
advance warning sign on the day of the accident. Curiously, 
the majority points to photographs taken in 2011 to support 
the proposition that tree branches blocked the view of the 
warning sign in 2008 at the time of the accident. The only 
competent evidence of the condition of the foliage near the 
time of the accident is set forth at pages 00503-00519 of the 
Appendix. From these photographs, taken the day after the 
accident, it appears that the foliage did not block the 
advanced warning sign. See App. 00515 (picture taken 191 
feet north of the crossing). Even if we were to use the 
photographs taken in 2011, the advanced warning sign does 
not appear to be obscured by foliage from at least as far as 
300 feet north of the crossing.  
 
The majority refers to tree branches covering the 
crossbucks, but Zimmerman‟s assertion regarding the 
crossbucks is that they were in “disrepair,” not that they too 
were covered by foliage. As to this assertion, he likewise has 
offered no competent evidence that the crossbucks were in 
disrepair at the time of the accident. Finally, although the 
majority has determined that “[p]hotographs suggest there 
once was a white line north of the crossing, but that the line 
had faded” by the time of the accident, Majority Opinion 38-
39, I conclude that there is no competent evidence to support 
this proposition. I agree that there does not appear to have 
been a painted line north of the crossing in 2008, judging 
from the photographs taken one day after the accident. 
Interpreting facts in the light most favorable to Zimmerman, 
however, does not require us to decide that evidence of fresh 
paint in 2011 means that the lines existed at some point prior 
to the accident, but later faded such that they needed 
repainting. 
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The majority rejects Norfolk Southern‟s causation 
argument, but here it has misconstrued Zimmerman‟s own 
testimony regarding the impact of his many crossings at the 
Diller Avenue crossing. According to the majority, “in his 
deposition, Zimmerman said that he had crossed the track 
many times before the accident and that he believed the 
crossing was inactive.” Majority Opinion 40 (citing App. 
00235). The majority states also that from Zimmerman‟s 
testimony, combined with evidence of poor maintenance of 
the crossing, “it is reasonable to infer that state of disrepair at 
least contributed to his belief that the crossing was inactive.” 
Id. at 40. However, a closer reading of the cited portions of 
Zimmerman‟s deposition testimony is instructive. 
Zimmerman stated, “[I] did not know that that track had a 
regular train on it. I have never seen a train on that track, and 
so I don‟t know what—when I would have actually looked to 
see if a train was coming. I certainly wasn‟t expecting—to my 
knowledge, it was an unused track.” App. 00235. Later, he 
stated “I mean, like I said, I never expected to see a train 
there.” App. 00236. Zimmerman now wishes to 
recharacterize his reason for believing that the crossing was 
inactive to be the result of Norfolk Southern‟s failure to 
maintain warning devices. His deposition testimony makes it 
clear, however, that he believed the crossing was inactive 
because he had never seen a train on that track, over his years 
in the area and hundreds of trips down Diller Avenue. 
 
Accordingly, I would hold that the District Court 
correctly granted summary judgment on the negligent failure 
to maintain crossing devices portion of Zimmerman‟s failure 
to maintain a safe crossing claim. 
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B. 
 
Next, Zimmerman contends that Norfolk Southern 
negligently failed to maintain a safe crossing when it failed to 
remove an obstruction, even though the obstruction was not 
located on the railroad‟s right-of-way. Indeed, Norfolk 
Southern neither possessed nor controlled any land beyond its 
narrow right-of-way in the area of the Diller Avenue crossing. 
Although he relies on Fallon v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 279 
A.2d 164 (Pa. 1971), to support his contention that Norfolk 
Southern had a duty to remove the building, the teachings of 
Fallon do not support this position. That case states that 
railroads have a special duty of care towards those who use a 
crossing with a “dangerously limited view,” and that duty is 
to “regulate the running of its trains as to make it possible for 
a driver to cross the tracks in safety if, when just before 
entering upon them, he stopped, looked and listened, and no 
train was within sight or sound.” Id. at 167 (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The 
majority, paraphrasing Fallon, states broadly that under 
Pennsylvania law, “railroads have a duty to ensure that 
motorists are able to see approaching trains.” Majority 
Opinion 40-41. As is clear from the emphasized language 
above, this is an incomplete statement of the law. 
 
The stop, look and listen rule, like the Occupied 
Crossing Rule, has a long history in Pennsylvania. In Briach 
v. Pa. R.R. Co., 462 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1972), this Court traced 
the origins of the stop, look and listen rule, noting that 
“[d]evelopment of the so-called „stop, look and listen‟ 
doctrine originated over a century ago,” in the case of Reeves 
v. Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co., 30 Pa. 454 (Pa. 1858), 
where “the court determined that a traveler on a public 
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highway „is bound to stop and look out for trains.‟” Briach, 
462 F.2d at 268. Later cases held that failure to stop and look 
constituted negligence per se, and the requirement to listen 
was added to the rule in 1867. Id. at 268-269. By 1873, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court “stated that the duty to „stop, 
look and listen‟ was an „unbending‟ rule of law and failure to 
comply with any one of the three absolutes constituted 
negligence as a matter of law.” Id. at 269 (quoting Pa. R.R. 
Co. v. Beale, 73 Pa. 504 (1873)). By 1972, this Court noted 
that recent case law from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
affirmed and utilized the stop, look and listen rule. Id.  
 
All of these cases, as well as Briach, pre-dated the 
Legislature‟s adoption of the Comparative Negligence Act. 
However, like the Occupied Crossing Rule, “the common law 
„stop, look, and listen‟ rule has survived the Legislature‟s 
abolishment of contributory negligence.” Krentz, 910 A.2d at 
29. Although under the Comparative Negligence Act a 
plaintiff‟s failure to stop, look and listen no longer constitutes 
an absolute bar to recovery in all railroad-crossing cases, here 
the long-standing obligation is embedded within the 
railroad’s duty to provide an adequate sight distance. The 
special duty under Fallon, which is triggered when a 
dangerously limited view exists, requires a railroad to make it 
possible for a driver to safely cross the tracks if that driver 
stops, looks and listens, and no train is within sight or sound. 
 
At a crossing with a dangerously limited view, a 
railroad is only required to regulate the running of its trains to 
make safe crossing possible for drivers who stop, look and 
listen. This is not to say that Zimmerman cannot recover 
because he did not stop, look and listen; I would hold that 
where a plaintiff cannot show that a railroad violated its duty 
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under Fallon—that is, the duty to run its trains in a manner 
that makes it safe for a driver to cross tracks after stopping, 
looking and listening for trains—summary judgment is 
appropriate. Based on the record, Zimmerman presented no 
evidence to establish that Norfolk Southern violated its 
special duty under Fallon.  
 
The record before us shows that the lead engine‟s 
headlight was on “full” and the horn had been blowing for 
one-quarter of a mile, or 45 seconds, such that two people 
traveling 60 feet behind Zimmerman could hear the horn as 
the train approached the Diller Avenue crossing. Zimmerman 
does not, and cannot, maintain that he stopped, looked and 
listened prior to crossing the tracks or that, even if he had, he 
would have nonetheless been harmed. He has represented that 
he has no present recollection of the events concerning his 
approach to the crossing and the collision. Not a whit of 
evidence was provided that he complied with the venerable 
stop, look and listen precepts of Pennsylvania law. Moreover, 
no contention is presented by brief or oral argument that he 
did so.  
 
It must be noted that the requirement to stop, look and 
listen is not abrogated merely because the motorist‟s view is 
obstructed at one point but not another. See Benner v. Phila. 
& R. Ry. Co., 105 A. 283, 285 (Pa. 1918) (“It is further 
argued that [plaintiff] was relieved from the obligation to stop 
because of the obstructions which prevented his view before 
crossing . . . but, if this be true, another duty was imposed 
upon him. It was his duty to alight and go to a point where he 
could make a proper observation.”). Zimmerman admitted 
that he could have seen the approaching train when he was 
“within less than forty feet of the crossing.” App. 00073. But, 
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when he came to that point where he could have seen the 
train, he did not “stop, look and listen,” as required by 
Pennsylvania law. He now asks us to hold the railroad at fault 
for his own failure to follow the law. I would not do so. 
Zimmerman offered no evidence that he had obeyed a 
fundamental maxim of the law formidably designed to 
prevent him from crashing into the side of a passing train. 
Accordingly, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to 
whether Norfolk Southern met its duty of care.  
 
C. 
 
I conclude therefore that no genuine issue of material 
fact exists regarding Norfolk Southern‟s maintenance of the 
Diller Avenue crossing. 
 
Notwithstanding my conclusion that Zimmerman 
failed to establish a prima facie claim of negligence under 
state law, he asserts that a claim was nevertheless made, and 
thus a genuine issue of material fact exists, based on the 
railroad‟s violation of its internal policy to contact 
landowners with obstructions located off of the railroad‟s 
right-of-way, which was “created pursuant to [federal] 
regulation.” See 49 U.S.C. § 20106(b)(1)(B). This argument 
is unpersuasive. He contends that the railroad‟s policy 
regarding sight obstructions was issued pursuant to 49 C.F.R. 
§§ 217.7, 217.11, and 218.1. These regulations, however, do 
not require railroads to create specific policies but merely 
require a railroad to keep copies of its operating rules and 
timetables, see § 217.7, and to keep records of its program of 
instruction to help employees learn the railroad‟s operating 
rules, see § 217.11. Section 218.1 merely states that the 
regulations provide minimum requirements and that railroads 
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are free to prescribe more stringent rules. He has failed to 
identify any regulation requiring Norfolk Southern to adopt 
the alleged policy at issue. 
 
Furthermore, nothing in 49 U.S.C. § 20106 creates a 
private right of action for a railroad‟s failure to comply with 
any internal policy which it created and which was not 
otherwise created pursuant to a federal regulation. 
Zimmerman‟s broad interpretation of § 20106, such that 
Norfolk Southern‟s internal policy was “created pursuant to a 
regulation,” is not supported by the statute‟s text. As the 
District Court properly noted, “[s]uch an interpretation would 
discourage railroads from otherwise implementing internal 
policies in order to avoid additional self-imposed duties of 
care.” App. 00033. 
 
I conclude, therefore, that although the common-law 
duty to maintain a safe crossing area—including the duties to 
maintain crossing devices and to provide adequate sight 
distance—is not preempted by federal law, the District Court 
nevertheless properly granted summary judgment as to this 
claim because Zimmerman failed to establish a prima facie 
claim that the railroad breached its duty. 
 
VII. 
 
The majority elects not to confront the critical 
Pennsylvania stop, look and listen rule, stating:  
The District Court explicitly refrained from 
deciding whether Zimmerman was negligent. 
Zimmerman, 2011 WL 3625039 at *21 n. 34 (“I 
do not need to consider defendant‟s additional 
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arguments that plaintiff was comparatively 
negligent by failing to comply with 
Pennsylvania law.”). And neither side has 
addressed the question of Zimmerman‟s 
negligence on appeal. We therefore refuse to 
affirm on these grounds.  
 
Majority Opinion 43 n.16. 
 
The majority‟s position requires special attention. 
First, “stop, look and listen” is language that appears in more 
than one place and for more than one reason: it is used not 
only to impose a duty on motorists, see 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 
3341(a), but also to limit the duty owed by railroads, see 
Fallon v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 279 A.2d 164 (Pa. 1971). I 
do not affirm the District Court‟s judgment on the ground that 
Zimmerman was negligent, but on the ground that even if we 
accept as true all Zimmerman has alleged in connection to his 
inadequate-sight-distance claim, he cannot establish that the 
railroad breached its limited common law duty to “regulate 
the running of its trains as to make it possible for a driver to 
cross the tracks in safety if, when just before entering upon 
them, he stopped, looked and listened, and no train was 
within sight or sound.” Id. at 167 (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  
 
Second,  I wish to make clear that my colleagues did 
not suggest that I lacked jurisdiction to discuss the 
implications of the stop, look and listen rule. Instead, they 
choose to “refuse to affirm on these grounds.” Had the 
majority challenged this Court‟s jurisdiction to consider this, 
they would have gotten nowhere, for an appellate court is 
authorized to affirm a district court‟s judgment for reasons 
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other than those stated by the trial court, as long as the record 
supports the judgment. See Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, 
Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 1145 n.1 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Helvering 
v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937). Similarly, an appellate 
court is not shackled to the briefs or oral argument of counsel. 
An appellate court is not stripped of jurisdiction to discuss an 
important—if not the most important—relevant precept of 
law where, as here, a motorist operates his vehicle into the 
side of a railroad train proceeding though a street crossing 
merely because (1) a district court refuses to discuss it even 
though raised by the defendant, and (2) the appellate lawyers 
decide not to discuss it by brief or oral argument. The issue 
was raised in the District Court. That vests in me the authority 
to consider it on appeal.  
 
In electing to refuse to consider the impact of 
Zimmerman‟s failure to “stop, look and listen” as a grounds 
that may warrant affirming the District Court, the majority 
reflects a theory of jurisprudence that has been rejected in 
America for almost 100 years. This jurisprudence of concepts 
was known by the Germans as Begriffsjurisprudenz, and was 
the theory behind the 17th Century movement to codify the 
law in much of Europe. Later, the prominent German 
jurisprudent Rudolf von Ihering insisted that the first question 
should be how will a rule or a decision operate in practice and 
advocated a jurisprudence of results. For example, if a rule of 
commercial law were in question, the search should be for the 
rule that best accords with and gives effect to sound business 
practice. Rudolf von Ihering titled this jurisprudence 
Wirklichkeitsjurisprudenz. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical 
Jurisprudence, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 605, 608, 610 (1908). See 
also Rudolf von Ihering, Der Geist des ro  mischen Rechts 
(1907). Whatever had been possible procedural restrictions on 
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appeal at one time in the Civil Law countries of European 
Nations utilizing the jurisprudence of concepts, at least until 
the end of the 19th century, as I will demonstrate below, we 
should not adhere to this now disfavored approach. 
 
In the beginning of the 20th century the great masters 
of American Jurisprudence—Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., 
Benjamin N. Cardozo and Professor Roscoe Pound—rejected 
the jurisprudence of concepts for what they called a 
jurisprudence of results. Because this discussion has not often 
appeared in many judicial opinions, if any at all, I will 
summarize how the great change came about, a change in the 
nature of jurisprudence doctrine that our courts have now 
followed for almost 100 years, a change that was advocated 
by these great American masters.  
 
In his classic The Nature of the Judicial Process, 
Cardozo explained hornbook doctrine that sometimes the 
source of the law to be embodied in a judgment is obvious, as 
when the Constitution or a statute applies. Benjamin N. 
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 14 (1921). In 
these situations, the judge simply obeys the constitutional or 
statutory rule. But when no constitutional or statutory 
mandate controls, the judge must compare that case with the 
precedents, “whether stored in his mind or hidden in the 
books.” Id. at 19. If the comparison yields a perfect fit, if both 
the law and its application are clear, the task is simple. If the 
law is unclear, it is necessary to “extract from the precedents 
the underlying principle” and then “determine the path or 
direction along which the principle is to move and develop, if 
it is not to wither and die.” Id. at 28. Cardozo cautioned that 
decisions “do not unfold their principles for the asking. They 
yield up their kernel slowly and painfully.” Id. at 29. He 
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discussed what he called the “organons” of the judicial 
process—the instruments by which we fix the bounds and 
tendencies of that principle's development and growth. He 
also discussed the use of history and customs, and then 
promulgated what in 1921 was considered a revolutionary 
technique of decision-making—the method of sociology, a 
jurisprudence that concentrated on results. 
 
By describing the elements at work in the caldron, 
Cardozo was performing the valued task of a traditional 
common law judicial analyst. That he ranks with Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr. as one of our greatest common law 
judges is scarcely now debatable. But to the extent that he 
developed, persuasively and gracefully, a legitimation for 
result-oriented jurisprudence, he became more a legal 
philosopher than a common law judge. He sought what ought 
to be the law, in contrast with what is. 
 
Although Cardozo is not generally listed as a member 
of the enthusiastic corps of American Realists, he must be 
ranked with Holmes, as an elder statesman of that exciting 
cadre of reformers. In the last quarter of the 20th century 
critics were quick to recognize the legitimacy of decisions 
based on social welfare, but in 1921 Cardozo's arguments 
brought respectability to what theretofore had been 
condemned as blatant result-oriented jurisprudence. He was 
neither timid nor uncertain in espousing his self-styled 
method of sociology. To him it was “the power of social 
justice,” and among all principles of the decision-making 
process, it was “the force which in our day and generation is 
becoming the greatest.” Id. at 65-66. To him the preferred 
gap-filler in addressing novel questions of law was the social 
welfare, defined “as public policy, the good of the collective 
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body,” or “the social gain that is wrought by adherence to the 
standards of right conduct, which find expression in the 
mores of the community.” Id. at 71-72. 
 
Accustomed as we are today to lavish reliance by 
prestigious courts on judicial concepts of public policy, 
Cardozo's statements in the early 1920s must be placed in the 
context of judicial process of that era. Judges then were 
disciples of what Rudolph von Ihering styled as a 
jurisprudence of concepts, and as early as 1897 American 
courts were being chided for undue reliance on concepts. 
 
In The Path of the Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes gently 
admonished: 
I think that the judges themselves have failed 
adequately to recognize their duty of weighing 
considerations of social advantage. The duty is 
inevitable, and the result of the often 
proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such 
considerations is simply to leave the very 
ground and foundation of judgments 
inarticulate, and often unconscious . . . . 
 
O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 
467 (1897). 
 
 Within a decade Roscoe Pound was trumpeting the 
same theme: “The most important and most constant cause of 
dissatisfaction with all law at all times is to be found in the 
necessarily mechanical operation of legal rules.” Roscoe 
Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
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Administration of Justice, 40 Am. L. Rev. 729 (1906), 
reprinted in 8 Baylor L. Rev. 1 (1956). 
 
Critics labeled this blind adherence to precedents, or to 
the rules and principles derived from them, “mechanical 
jurisprudence” and “slot machine justice.” Pound called for a 
new look at what he described as “pragmatism as a 
philosophy of law,” and stated vigorously: “The nadir of 
mechanical jurisprudence is reached when conceptions are 
used, not as premises from which to reason, but as ultimate 
solutions. So used, they cease to be conceptions and become 
empty words.” Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 
Colum. L. Rev. 605, 608, 610 (1908). 
 
Yet founders of the Results Jurisprudence—Holmes, 
Pound and Cardozo—had early historical support for their 
advocacy. Professor Calvin Woodard of the University of 
Virginia suggests that their theory draws on Jeremy 
Bentham's utilitarian thesis: 
[T]he advocates of Sociological Jurisprudence 
seized upon this aspect of Bentham‟s message. 
Like him, they insisted that law has a practical, 
real world moral purpose, though they defined 
that purpose more in terms of social justice, and 
the balancing of social interests, than 
[Bentham's] “the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number.” 
 
Calvin Woodard, Thoughts on the Interplay Between 
Morality and Law in Modern Legal Thought, 64 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 784, 795 (1989). 
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Typical of judicial utterances that had disturbed 
Holmes, Pound, and Cardozo was one by the Maryland Court 
of Appeals in 1895: “Obviously a principle, if sound, ought to 
be applied wherever it logically leads, without reference to 
ulterior results.” Gluck v. Baltimore, 32 A. 515, 517 (Md. 
1895). In contrast, the same year that Cardozo delivered the 
Storrs Lecture at Yale, he seized the opportunity to put his 
new theory into practice by publicly rejecting blind 
conceptual jurisprudence in Hynes v. New York Central 
Railroad Co., 131 N.E. 898 (1921). A sixteen-year-old boy 
had been injured while using a crude springboard to dive into 
the Harlem River. The trial court had ruled that if the youth 
had climbed on the springboard from the river before 
beginning his dive, the defendant landowner would have been 
held to the test of ordinary care, but because the boy had 
mounted from land owned by the defendant railroad 
company, the court held the defendant to the lower standard 
of care owed to a trespasser. Cardozo rejected this analysis, 
describing it as an “extension of a maxim or a definition with 
relentless disregard of consequences to „a dryly logical 
extreme.‟ The approximate and relative became the definite 
and absolute.” Id. at 900. 
 
Cardozo's opinion in Hynes is a prototype, and his The 
Nature of the Judicial Process an apologia, for decision-
making based on result-oriented judicial concepts of public 
policy. The philosophical underpinnings of what Cardozo 
described as the sociological or results method run counter to 
the widely held notion that the public policy should be 
formulated and promulgated only by the legislative branch of 
government. When judges rather than the legislators declare 
public policy, their declarations produce local and national 
tensions. When judges utilize this method, laymen and some 
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lawyers label them as “activists,” “liberals,” “loose 
constructionists,” and a host of other epithets, gentle and 
otherwise. 
 
But modern American jurisprudence is more than the 
results method, although its influence is strongly felt. The 
legal realists of the 1930s and 40s worried about what they 
called “the social performance of law.” Those same concerns 
are said to lie close to the heart of the Critical Studies 
Movement as well. To be sure, the Law and Economics 
school can be said to be result-oriented, but it stresses 
“economic efficiency” rather than social justice. 
 
Modern American jurisprudence constantly seeks the 
answers to the serious questions presented by the theories of 
adjudication, theories both old and new. We must keep in 
mind the central question put to us by the thoughtful 
Professor Woodard: 
What better measure is there of the value of a 
legal system, or indeed of the rule of law itself, 
than the quality of life of those subject to it?  
And if this approach stresses the morality of 
results, it also puts a huge moral burden on the 
hand that wields the tool of law. 
 
Woodard, supra, at 796. 
 
 From the foregoing, in this railroad crossing case, stop, 
look and listen may not be cast aside as in the former era of a 
jurisprudence of concepts (we won‟t meet it on appeal 
because the trial judge did not meet it). In modern concepts of 
jurisprudence to ignore this is to run in the face of Holmes‟s 
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words, “I think that the judges themselves have failed 
adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations 
of social advantage.  The duty is inevitable, . . . ” And also the 
words of Pound: “The most important and most constant 
cause of dissatisfaction with all law at all times is to be found 
in the necessarily mechanical operation of legal rules.” And 
finally the words of Cardozo in New York Central Railroad: 
you should not extend “a maxim or a definition with 
relentless disregard of consequences to „a dryly logical 
extreme.‟” 
 
 By 1974 Harry W. Jones, Cardozo Professor of Law at 
Columbia Law School, would teach us: 
Law is not a form of art for art‟s sake; its ends-
in-view are social, nothing more and nothing 
less than the establishment and maintenance of 
a social environment in which the quality of 
human life can be spirited, improving and 
unimpaired. 
 
Harry W. Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1023, 1025 (1974) 
  
The Pennsylvania stop, look and listen rule was an 
omnipresent brooding presence in this case. I will not put my 
head in the sand and ignore it. 
 
VIII. 
 
 The next issue is whether the District Court properly 
granted Norfolk Southern‟s motion for summary judgment on 
Zimmerman‟s excessive-speed claim. I agree with the 
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majority opinion insofar as it holds that excessive-speed 
claims are preempted when a train is traveling below a 
federally mandated speed limit. Majority Opinion 14. I also 
agree with the majority that 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 creates 
federally mandated speed limits by establishing “the degree 
of care that railroads must exercise on each class of tracks: 
trains should not exceed ten miles per hour on Class 1 tracks, 
twenty-five miles per hour on Class 2 tracks, and so on.” 
Majority Opinion 16.  
 
I disagree, however, with the majority‟s holding that 
Zimmerman‟s excessive-speed claim is not preempted by 
§ 213.9 because he has raised a triable issue of fact as to 
whether the track at the Diller Avenue crossing was a Class 1 
track—the only class of track for which the train‟s speed 
would have exceeded the federally mandated limit under 
§ 213.9, and the only class of track for which Zimmerman‟s 
claim would therefore not be preempted by § 213.9. I would 
hold that Zimmerman failed to provide any competent 
evidence that the tracks were classified as Class 1 because, as 
the District Court held, the limited evidence Zimmerman 
sought to introduce for this purpose was privileged under 
either 23 U.S.C. § 409 or 49 U.S.C. § 20903.  Zimmerman is 
left without any competent evidence to rebut Norfolk 
Southern‟s testimony that the track was either Class 2 or 
Class 3, which both have maximum speed limits greater than 
the speed the train was traveling, and therefore Zimmerman‟s 
excessive-speed claim is preempted by § 213.9 and summary 
judgment was proper.  
 
A. 
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Zimmerman sought to introduce two groups of 
documents to challenge Norfolk Southern‟s testimony that the 
track at issue was a Class 2 or Class 3 track: inventory 
documents from the Department of Transportation‟s National 
Crossing Inventory and accident reports dating back to 1975. 
I would hold that the inventory documents were privileged 
under 23 U.S.C. § 409 and that the accident reports were 
privileged under 49 U.S.C. § 20903.  
 
B. 
 
The first group of documents Zimmerman sought to 
introduce were nine documents titled “U.S. DOT-Crossing 
Inventory Information.” Eight of these documents state a 
maximum permissible speed of 10 miles per hour for trains 
crossing Diller Avenue, and one states a maximum 
permissible speed of 15 miles per hour. If admitted into 
evidence, these documents would create a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the operation of the train was 
negligent per se, given that it was traveling at a speed of 24 
miles per hour at the time of the collision. Furthermore, they 
would establish the possibility that Zimmerman‟s excessive-
speed claim is not preempted by § 213.9 because they would 
demonstrate that Norfolk Southern may have exceeded the 
federally mandated speed limit set for the Diller Avenue 
crossing.   
 
To determine whether the Inventory documents are 
admissible, both the majority and I must analyze carefully 23 
U.S.C. § 409, which states: 
[R]eports, surveys, schedules, lists, or data 
compiled or collected for the purpose of 
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identifying, evaluating, or planning the safety 
enhancement of . . . railway-highway crossings, 
pursuant to sections 130, 144, and 148 of this 
title or for the purpose of developing any 
highway safety construction improvement 
project which may be implemented utilizing 
Federal-aid highway funds shall not be subject 
to discovery or admitted into evidence in a 
Federal or State court proceeding or considered 
for other purposes in any action for damages 
arising from any occurrence at a location 
mentioned or addressed in such reports, 
surveys, schedules, lists, or data. 
 
(emphasis added).  
 
The Supreme Court teaches that § 409 was enacted to 
facilitate programs including the Crossings Program 
promulgated by 23 U.S.C. § 130. See Pierce Cnty. v. Guillen, 
537 U.S. 129, 133-134 (2003). The Crossings Program was 
enacted to assist states in identifying highways and railways 
in need of improvements. It makes funds available to states 
for the “cost of construction of projects for the elimination of 
hazards of railway-highway crossings.” § 130(a). To 
participate, states must “conduct and systematically maintain 
a survey of all highways to identify those railroad crossings 
which may require separation, relocation, or protective 
devices, and establish and implement a schedule of projects 
for this purpose.” § 130(d). Because participation in these 
programs required states to disclose safety-related 
information that could expose them to civil liability, such as 
information related to accident sites, Congress adopted § 409 
to encourage disclosure. See Guillen, 537 U.S. at 133-134.  
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Additionally, in Guillen, the Supreme Court concluded 
that § 409 protected all data collected by an agency in support 
of the Federal Hazard Elimination Program (“§ 152”), 
regardless of the source of the information. See id. at 145-
146. At the time, § 152 appeared within the text of § 409 as a 
program falling within the statute‟s coverage, just as § 130 
appeared and still appears to this day within the text of § 409. 
For this reason, I would hold that the teachings of Guillen 
apply equally to § 130 programs and would hold that § 409 
protects all data collected by an agency in support of § 130, 
regardless of the source of information. Because I conclude 
that the inventory documents sought to be introduced here fall 
within § 409, they are inadmissible and I would affirm the 
District Court‟s holding. 
 
C. 
 
Because § 409 does not protect information that was 
compiled, collected, obtained and utilized for purposes 
unrelated to one of the three programs identified in the 
statute, see Guillen, 537 U.S. at 146, the relevant inquiry 
here, in determining whether § 409 applies, is whether the 
information in the inventory documents was collected, 
generated or compiled for the purpose of pursuing the 
objectives of the federal program promulgated by § 130.  
 
I agree with the District Court that the inventory 
documents were “surveys,” which were “compiled and 
collected” “for the purposes of . . . planning the safety 
enhancement of railway-highway crossings,” and done 
pursuant to § 130, which requires states to “conduct and 
systematically maintain a survey of all highways to identify 
33 
 
 
those railroad crossings which may require 
[improvements] . . . .” See App. 00047. 
 
The inventory documents at issue were compiled and 
collected for the U.S. DOT National Highway-Rail Crossing 
Inventory Program, which began in the 1970s after the 
passage of The Federal-Aid Highway Act. “The purpose of 
the U.S. DOT National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory 
Program is to provide for the existence of a national inventory 
database that can be . . . used . . . for planning and 
implementation of crossing improvement programs . . . .” 
Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. DOT National 
Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory: Policy, Procedures and 
Instructions for States and Railroads 3 (2007), 
http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/safety/RXIPolicyInstructio
ns0807.pdf [hereinafter “2007 Manual”]. Moreover, the 
current Program Manual instructs railroads to send their 
completed inventory documents to the appropriate “State 
Inventory Contact” so that the last portion of the form may be 
completed by the state. 2007 Manual 6. The state‟s 
participation in the Inventory Program, and its use of the 
same forms used by the railroads, provides further support 
that the inventory documents are privileged under § 409.   
 
Congress clearly and emphatically intended by 
enacting § 409 to prohibit this type of federally required 
record keeping from being used as a “tool in litigation.” See 
Guillen, 537 U.S. at 146 (explaining that Congress amended 
§ 409 to include “or collected” in order “to make clear that § 
152 [a section formerly included in the text of § 409 as § 130 
is now included] was not intended to be an effort-free tool in 
litigation against state and local governments.”). Additionally, 
because the inventory documents at issue were “compiled and 
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collected” for the U.S. DOT National Highway-Rail Crossing 
Inventory Program, the purpose of which is “to provide for 
the existence of a national inventory database that can be . . . 
used . . . for planning and implement[ing] . . . crossing 
improvement programs,” I would hold the documents were 
collected, generated or compiled for the purposes of § 130 
and would affirm.  
 
D. 
 
In addition to the inventory documents, Zimmerman 
attempted to introduce ten accident reports involving the 
Diller Avenue crossing, five of which involve accidents from 
the 1970s and state the track is a Class 1 track. I would hold 
that The District Court correctly determined that these 
accident reports were privileged pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 
§ 20903, which states in part: 
No part of an accident or incident report filed 
by a railroad carrier under section 20901 of 
[Title 49] . . . may be used in a civil action for 
damages resulting from a matter mentioned in 
the report. 
A railroad, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 20901(a), is 
required to file a monthly report with the Secretary of 
Transportation “on all accidents and incidents resulting in 
injury or death to an individual,” and the parties do not 
dispute that the reports at issue here were filed pursuant to § 
20901.  
 
The majority opinion limits this privilege to 
encompass only the report filed in direct response to 
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Zimmerman‟s accident while leaving open the possibility that 
all other reports—whether filed before or after Zimmerman‟s 
accident—may be used in his lawsuit against Norfolk 
Southern. Such a holding defeats the general purpose of 
privileges such as § 20903, which promote public safety by 
encouraging candor. I would hold, therefore, that all the 
accident reports Zimmerman seeks to introduce fall within the 
§ 20903 privilege. 
 
E. 
 
Without the inventory documents and accident reports, 
there is no evidence that the tracks at Diller Avenue were 
classified as Class 1, with a maximum permissible speed of 
10 miles per hour. And, because it is undisputed that the train 
was traveling at 24 miles per hour—which is permissible on 
both Class 2 and Class 3 tracks—no genuine issue of material 
fact exists as to whether the train exceeded the speed 
permissible under § 213.9. Therefore, Zimmerman‟s claim of 
excessive speed is preempted and summary judgment was 
proper. 
 
* * * * * 
 
I would conclude that the District Court properly held 
that Zimmerman‟s claims of negligence based on (1) 
inadequate signals and (2) excessive speed are preempted. I 
would conclude also that the District Court did not err in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern for 
Zimmerman‟s claims that the railroad failed to (3) maintain a 
reasonably safe crossing and (4) provide adequate sight 
distance, because Zimmerman failed to establish a prima facie 
negligence claim, and therefore no genuine issue of material 
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fact exists.  
 
Finally, I would hold that the District Court properly 
concluded that Zimmerman‟s excessive-speed claim is 
preempted by § 213.9 because Zimmerman cannot establish 
that there is a material issue of fact as to whether the train‟s 
speed exceeded the federal limit permitted at the Diller 
Avenue crossing without the inventory documents and 
accident reports, which I would hold are privileged. Summary 
judgment was therefore appropriate and I would affirm the 
District Court‟s judgment in all respects. 
